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SPOOFING AND ITS REGULATION
Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten, and Sue S.
Guan
Nearly a century after the United States enacted its first
securities laws, urgent questions remain as to the scope of
manipulation law: whether manipulation is possible in
principle, and if so, how the law should respond in practice.
Sharp disagreement among courts, economists, and legal
scholars as to whether trading or quoting activity constitutes
illegal manipulation has led to a legal framework that lacks
precision and cogency. Moreover, the poorly articulated
normative basis for court rulings has resulted in enforcement
that is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive in ways that do
a poor job of discouraging socially harmful transactions and
enabling socially beneficial ones.
This Article seeks to clarify this confusion. Drawing on
microstructure and financial economics, this Article offers a
new understanding of a common kind of quote-driven
manipulation, often referred to as “spoofing.” By employing an
analytical and normative framework developed previously by
two of the authors in assessing another major form of
manipulation, trade-driven manipulation, this Article
assesses the impact of spoofing on what occurs in the securities
markets and carefully evaluates its effects on social welfare
and economic efficiency. The result is a new understanding of
quote-based manipulation that helps resolve essential
questions in manipulation law and provides guidance for
future regulation and enforcement.
I. Introduction ...................................................................... 1246
II. Overview ......................................................................... 1257
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly a century has passed since the United States
enacted its first securities laws. Principally animated by the
desire to prevent manipulation that was deemed a central
cause of the 1929 stock market crash,1 the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) expressly prohibits
manipulation pursuant to sections 9 and 10(b).2 Despite this
initial intensity of concern, the regulation of manipulation
has, for most of the following eighty-seven years, largely failed
to attract much serious scholarship by either legal jurists or

1 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit
“Manipulation” in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503 (1991 (“The
drafters of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 . . . were convinced that there was a direct link between excessive
speculation, the stock market crash of 1929, and the Great Depression of
the 1930s.” (footnotes omitted)); Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency
Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 523, 551 (2014)
(“[P]revention of manipulation has been said to be at ‘the very heart’ of the
securities acts.” (quoting LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 853 (2d ed. 1988))).
2 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(2), 78j(b)
(2018).
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economists. And the minimal case law interpreting these
statutory provisions has been fraught with confusion.
In the last few decades, some academics have begun to
consider one major type of manipulation: trade-driven
manipulation.3 This is where the manipulator uses purchases
and/or sales to effect changes in the price of a security that
allow the manipulator to profit. In contrast, there continues
to be almost no scholarly attention paid to another major type
of manipulation: quote-driven manipulation. This is where the
manipulator uses quotes—binding commitments posted on an
exchange indicating a willingness, until canceled, to buy or
sell a given number of shares at a stated price—in order to
buy or sell shares at a more favorable price in a separate
transaction. Once the price for the separate transaction has
been favorably changed, the manipulator is usually able to
cancel her quotes before they are accepted and become
executed transactions.
These shortfalls in the scholarly literature and in the law
are ironic given that some of the most noteworthy
3 Until very recently, even such literature as has existed consisted of
legal and economics academics largely talking past each other. Perhaps the
most well-known piece in the legal literature, by Daniel Fischel and David
Ross, argues that trade-driven manipulation is so difficult to identify that
it is not worth regulating. Fischel & Ross, supra note 1. This piece ignored
the then-developing market microstructure literature that shows that it
may not be so difficult, a point also missed by Steve Thel, the strongest critic
of the Fischel and Ross piece. Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes—The
Mechanics of Securities Manipulation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 219 (1994)
Similarly, much of the literature on the subject by economists that does
employ learning from microstructure economics has been written without a
clear notion of what the legal requirements are for a trade to be
manipulative. In the last few years, some scholarship has taken a more
nuanced view of trade-driven manipulation by incorporating both legal and
economic arguments. See, e.g., Albert S. Kyle & S. Viswanathan, How To
Define Illegal Price Manipulation, 98 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC.) 274
(2008); Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Stock
Market Manipulation and Its Regulation, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 67 (2018)
[hereinafter Fox et al., Manipulation]; MERRITT B. FOX, LAWRENCE R.
GLOSTEN & GABRIEL V. RAUTERBERG, THE NEW STOCK MARKET: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND POLICY 200–40 (2019) [hereinafter FOX ET AL., THE NEW
STOCK MARKET]; Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Legitimate Yet Manipulative: The
Conundrum of Open-Market Manipulation, 68 DUKE L.J. 479 (2018).
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manipulation cases brought by the government in recent
years—United States v. Coscia4 and CFTC v. Nav Sarao
Futures Ltd. PLC5 (“Sarao”) (involving futures market
activity), and SEC v. Taub6 and SEC v. Lek Securities
Corporation (“Lek”)7 (involving equity market activity)—are
based on allegations of quote-driven, not trade-driven
behavior. In the Sarao case, the Department of Justice
charged a single individual with a quote-driven manipulation
that was alleged to have “significantly” contributed to 2010’s
“Flash Crash,” during which U.S. equity market prices
temporarily declined by more than nine percent.8 Individual
defendants in these cases have sometimes made tens of
millions of dollars using quote-based strategies.9
The obstacles to assessing the appropriate reach of
manipulation law originate with the statutory provisions
themselves. The Exchange Act provides remarkably little
guidance as to the conduct covered by the statutory
provisions. Section 9(a)(2) prohibits effecting “a series of
transactions” in a security (1) that “creat[e] actual or apparent
active trading” or affect its price, (2) “for the purpose of
inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others.” 10
866 F.3d 782, 788–89 (7th Cir. 2017).
No. 15-cv-3398, 2016 WL 8257513, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2016).
6 Amended Complaint at 7–8, SEC v. Taub, No. 2:16-cv-09130 (D.N.J.
Apr. 26, 2018), ECF No. 37.
7 276 F. Supp. 3d 49, 54–55 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
8 Nathaniel Popper & Jenny Anderson,
Trader Arrested in
Manipulation That Contributed to 2010 ‘Flash Crash’, N.Y. T IMES (Apr. 21,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/business/dealbook/trader-inbritain-arrested-on-charges-of-manipulation-that-led-to-2010-flashcrash.html [http://perma.cc/R73P-L7AL]; Suzi Ring, Flash-Crash Trader
Sarao Gets Bail in U.S. Extradition Fight, B LOOMBERG BUS . (Apr. 22, 2015,
11:36 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-22/flashcrash-trader-sarao-gets-bail-in-u-s-extradition-fight (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review) (reporting that CFTC Enforcement
Director Aitan Goelman said that Sarao was “a significant factor in market
imbalance . . . [which] was one of the chief conditions that allowed the flash
crash to occur”).
9 E.g., Lek Sec. Corp., 276 F. Supp.3d at 54 (“layering and cross-market
manipulation activity generated profits of more than $28 million.”).
10 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2018).
4
5
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With regard to its possible application to trade-driven
manipulation, the first half of the proscription captures
conduct that will be part of nearly every trading strategy, no
matter how innocuous: Buying or selling a security inherently
entails the creation of an actual trade and often affects its
price. The force of the prohibition is thus found in the second
half of the proscription, the vague clause relating to purpose.
With regard to section 9(a)(2)’s possible application to quotedriven manipulation, the first half of the proscription presents
the opposite problem: It is unclear that the first half applies
to any use of quotes. Placing into the market an offer to sell,
or an offer to buy, at a given price, is clearly an “action,” but
with no counterparty involved, it is hard to call it a
“transaction.” And even if that problem is surmounted, there
is still the problem, shared with applying section 9(a)(2) to
trade-driven manipulation, of the vague clause relating to
purpose that constitutes the second half of the proscription.
Section 10(b) starkly prohibits the use, in violation of a
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule, of “any
manipulative or deceptive device” in connection with trading
a security.11 The term “manipulative” on its face is capacious
enough to potentially capture behavior involving quotes, but
the statute fails to define what the reach of the term in fact is,
and the only SEC attempt to do so through rulemaking merely
refers back to section 9.12 Moreover, the rule promulgated
under section 10(b) that has been used to impose liability for
certain kinds of allegedly manipulative behavior, Rule 10b-5,
does not even contain the word “manipulation.”13
Two of us have written earlier on the appropriate
application of these statutory provisions to trade-driven

Id. § 78j(b).
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-1 (2021) (“The term manipulative . . . is
hereby defined to include any act or omission to act with respect to any
security exempted from the operation of section 12(a) . . . pursuant to any
section in this part which specifically provides that this section shall be
applicable to such security if such act or omission to act would have been
unlawful under section 9(a)[.]”).
13 See Id. § 240.10b-5.
11
12
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manipulation.14 As we noted there, strikingly little progress
has been made in defining these statutory terms in the nearly
nine decades since the Exchange Act’s passage.15 Many
commentators do not consider manipulation to be a
sufficiently meaningful concept as to justify a prohibition on
any sort of behavior.16 Other jurists, legal scholars, and
economists consider manipulation to be a useful concept but
have struggled to define the term and determine its harms.
Overly broad or circular definitions are often invoked,
occasionally caveated by “I know it when I see it” platitudes.17
See Fox et al., Manipulation, supra note 2.
Id. at 70.
16 See, e.g., Fischel & Ross, supra note 1, at 506–07 (“[N]o satisfactory
definition of [manipulation] exists. . . . the concept of manipulation should
be abandoned[.]”); Robert C. Lower, Disruptions of the Futures Market: A
Comment on Dealing with Market Manipulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 391, 392
(1991) (“Manipulation is difficult to define . . . . [D]rawing a line between
healthy economic behavior and that which is offensive has proved to be too
subjective and imprecise to produce an effective regulatory tool.”). The
Supreme Court has even on occasion apparently done away with any
distinction between a “manipulative” device and a “deceptive” one by
determining that any violation of section 10(b) must involve a
misrepresentation. See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1,7–8
(1985) (“Congress used the phrase ‘manipulative or deceptive’ in § 10(b) as
well, and we have interpreted ‘manipulative’ in that context to require
misrepresentation.” (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
476–77 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 43 (1977); Ernst
& Ernst Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976))); see also Steve Thel,
Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(b): Security Prices and the
Text of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359,
378–79 (1988) (describing the difficulties of defining manipulation under
federal securities law).
17 See, e.g., THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
471 (6th ed. 2009) (“The purpose of the various statutes and rules
prohibiting market manipulation is to prevent activities that rig the market
and to thereby facilitate operation of the ‘natural law’ of supply and
demand. . . . [M]anipulation consists of any intentional interference with
supply and demand.”). Another articulation characterizes the core of
manipulation “as exercising unsupported price pressure because this creates
societal costs.” Matthijs Nelemans, Redefining Trade-Based Market
Manipulation, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1169, 1176 (2008). In these formulations,
the normative criticism of the relevant conduct is doing all the work in
determining the precise sort of behavior to be prohibited, yet no guidance is
14
15
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We noted that for trade-driven manipulation, the result has
been a legal framework that lacks precision, cogency, and
consistent application. This has resulted in unpredictable and
varying outcomes for cases with comparable facts, raising
basic questions of fairness.18 Moreover, the poorly articulated
normative basis for these rulings results in enforcement that
is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive in ways that do a
poor job of discouraging socially harmful transactions and
enabling socially beneficial ones.19 The law and commentary
on quote-driven manipulation have these same problems in
spades.
In seeking to find a way out of this quagmire, this Article
employs a similar approach to that in our earlier work. We
start with some basic constraints on a theory of quote
supplied as to what actually violates the norm. Alternatively, the
formulation can be too narrow. For example, two well-known microstructure
economists propose that a practice is manipulative only if it lowers both
price accuracy and liquidity. Kyle & Viswanathan, supra note 2, at 274. This
prohibition neglects strategies that increase one and reduce the other, and
the negative social impact of the market characteristic that is lowered
outweighs the positive impact from the one that is increased. Attempts to
define manipulation in related areas, such as commodities regulation,
reveal some of the same struggles. See, e.g., In re Henner, 30 Agric. Dec.
1151 (U.S.D.A. 1971) (“‘Manipulation’ is a vague term used in a wide and
inclusive manner, possessing varying shades of meaning, and almost always
conveying the idea of blame-worthiness deserving of censure.” (quoting J. G.
SMITH, ORGANIZED PRODUCE MARKETS 109 (1922))); 2 TIMOTHY J. SNIDER,
REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS § 12.01,
at 12-5 (2d ed. 1995) (referring to the law of manipulation as “a murky
miasma of questionable analysis and unclear effect”); see also Jonathan R.
Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation
in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563, 588–90 (2005) (noting the
negative effects of manipulation on liquidity); Edward T. McDermott,
Defining Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: The Futures
“Squeeze,” 74 NW. U. L. REV. 202, 205 (1979) (referring to manipulation law
as “an embarrassment—confusing, contradictory, complex, and
unsophisticated”); Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern
Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 1031, 1053–55, 1089 (2016).
18 Fox et al., Manipulation, supra note 2. FOX ET AL., THE NEW STOCK
MARKET, supra note 2, at 201.
19 Fox et al., Manipulation, supra note 2. FOX ET AL., THE NEW STOCK
MARKET, supra note 2, at 201.
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manipulation and suggest that for a quote driven strategy to
be considered manipulation prohibited by the Exchange Act,
four essential queries must be answered in the affirmative.
First, is the strategy, exclusively as a conceptual matter,
distinguishable from other, plainly acceptable quote-driven
strategies, and does the strategy cause social harm? Second,
does the strategy plausibly fit under the general dictionary
meaning of the term “manipulation”? Third, are there
circumstances under which the strategy can yield positive
expected profits, and do they occur often enough to raise
concern? Fourth, are there practical methods for prohibiting
the strategy whereby the social gains from its reduction or
elimination exceed the social costs of doing so, including
deterring socially beneficial activity that might be erroneously
classified as instances of the practice?20 This four-question
approach starts with some basic rules of statutory
interpretation to identify the outer borders of the plausible
reach of the prohibitions of quote-driven manipulation under
sections 9 and 10(b), and then seeks to determine, on policy
grounds, what activities within these outer borders ought
actually to be prohibited.
In this Article, we utilize this approach to analyze the most
common quote-driven strategy that has been labeled as
“manipulative” in at least some commentary and found to be
illegal in at least some actions against persons undertaking it.
We will refer to this strategy as “at or away quote
manipulation” or its more common, though sometimes less
precisely defined label, “spoofing.” In advance of describing
this strategy, a two-paragraph introduction to the way
modern equity markets work and associated vocabulary is in
order.

20 A practice or regulation can generate social harm if it lowers
economic efficiency in a specific way or systematically leads to unfair
outcomes. It can generate a social gain if it improves economic efficiency or
reduces unfairness. See infra Part III. Thus, the desirability of a regulation
that prohibits a specific practice turns on whether the world with the
regulation is superior to the world without it, when evaluating on a net basis
all the social harms and benefits arising in a comparison between a world
with and without the regulation.

No. 3:1244]

SPOOFING AND ITS REGULATION

1253

Equities trade on a variety of trading venues, nearly all of
which are electronic limit order books, where a trader can post
a limit order, which is a firm commitment (until cancelled) to
buy or sell up to a specified number of shares at a quoted
price.21 For a posted sell limit order, this stated limit price is
an offer. For a posted buy limit order, this stated limit price is
a bid.22 Bids and offers are often referred to as quotes.23 A
computer (the venue’s matching engine) matches these posted
limit orders, referred to as non-marketable limit orders, with
incoming buy and sell marketable orders, which are orders
that have terms allowing them to execute at what is then the
nationally best available price in the market.24 The best offer
is referred to as the NBO; the best bid is referred to as the
NBB; and the two together are referred to as the NBBO.25
Today, high-frequency traders (HFTs) post a significant
portion of the quotes that are matched in this fashion with
marketable orders and result in executed trades.26 An HFT

21 FOX ET AL., THE NEW STOCK MARKET, supra note 2, at 13 (footnote
omitted).
22 Id. at 300 n.4.
23 See id. at 13.
24 Id.
25 Marketable orders include both “market orders” and “marketable
limit orders.” A “market order” is where the person submitting the order
commits to trading at whatever is the best available price in the market.
The computer will also match the limit orders posted on the venue with
“marketable limit orders.” A buy limit order is “marketable” when it has a
limit price greater than or equal to the lowest offer in the market, and a sell
limit order is “marketable” when it has a limit price less than or equal to
the highest bid. It is “non-marketable” if it is at a price equal to or inferior
to the best offer or bid in the market. See id.; Fox et al., Manipulation, supra
note 2, at 90.
26 See Jonathan Brogaard, Terrence Hendershott & Ryan Riordan,
High-Frequency Trading and Price Discovery, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2267
(2014) (from NASDAQ data set, finding that HFTs supply liquidity for fortytwo percent of all trades and provide the market quotes forty-two percent of
the time); see also Allen Carrion, Very Fast Money: High-Frequency Trading
on the NASDAQ, 16 J. FIN. MKTS. 680, 680–81 (2013) (“[A]n identified group
of high-frequency traders (HFTs) participates in 68.3% of the dollar volume
in the [paper’s] sample[.]”). See generally Albert J. Menkveld, High
Frequency Trading and the New Market Makers, 16 J. FIN. MKTS. 712, 714–
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utilizes high-speed communications to continuously update its
information concerning transactions occurring in each stock
that it commonly trades, as well as changes in the quotes
posted by others on every major trading venue.27 The HFT
automatically feeds this information into a computer that uses
algorithms to change the prices and quantities of its own
quotes posted on each of the various trading venues. 28
Against this background, we can define “at-or-away quote
manipulation” or what, for our purposes, we will call
“spoofing.” This manipulative strategy involves three steps.
First, the manipulator engages in an activity intended to
result in an actual transaction by submitting either a bid at
the current NBB or an offer at the current NBO. Second, as
the actual manipulative step, the manipulator submits to an
exchange one or more quotes going in the opposite direction,
each for a large number of shares at a price equal to, or less
favorable than the preexisting best quote in the market. So, if
these quotes are offers, the price of each is equal to or above
the preexisting NBO, and if these quotes are bids, the price of
each is at or below the preexisting NBB. The motivation for
this second step is to influence the quoting and transacting
behavior of other market participants in order to allow the
manipulator’s first step to result in an actual purchase or sale
at a more favorable price than was otherwise likely to occur.
Third, the manipulator cancels their quotes (assuming they
have not already been executed against), either just before or
just after the actual transaction. There are other types of
quote manipulation besides spoofing,29 but we will save an
analysis of them for future work.
15 (2013) (discussing high frequency traders’ role as market makers in
today’s markets).
27 FOX ET AL., THE NEW STOCK MARKET, supra note 3, at 95–96.
28 Id. at 95 (identifying characteristics of HFTs).
29 We have identified three other kinds of quote manipulation, each
differing from spoofing only with regard to the manipulative step, i.e., the
method by which others are induced to change their quotes or engage in
transactions to the advantage of the manipulator in terms of her second
step. “Inside-the-spread quote manipulation” involves, as its manipulative
step, submitting one or more quotes at prices within the spread between the
then preexisting NBO and NBB. “Opening quote manipulation” involves, as
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Each of spoofing’s three steps—submitting the large
quotes, the actual purchase or sale of shares, and cancelling
of the large quotes—is, by itself, a perfectly acceptable form of
behavior of a kind that is at the core of any efficiently
operating secondary market for securities. What the critical
commentators and case opinions find problematic about the
strategy is the three steps being undertaken together,
combined with the intent to have the quotes favorably
influence the price at which the actual transaction occurs. But
what is the social harm, if any, when the manipulator
succeeds? Often missing in these accounts by commentators
and jurists is a perspicuous determination of precisely who is
hurt and who is helped if the practice is left unregulated, and
how this would change if the practice were instead banned by
law. Our framework permits a comparison of these two worlds
in terms of economic efficiency and the fairness of the
resulting wealth positions of the various market participants.
We then derive an approach that provides regulators the tools
to deter actually socially undesirable quote-driven activity
without unnecessarily deterring socially beneficial quoting
that superficially appears to be undesirable. Although
objections to certain quoting practices are commonly framed
in terms of their unfairness, we argue that such practices are
often undesirable mostly on straightforward efficiency
grounds.
The normative and analytical building blocks in our
framework derive from key results in microstructure and
financial economics. Normatively, we posit that the primary
social functions of trading markets pertain to directing the
efficient allocation of capital across firms, and between
households and enterprises over time, and to providing

its manipulative step, submitting one or more quotes as part of the auction
process that constitutes an exchange’s daily opening. “Auto-quote
manipulation” involves, as its manipulative step, submitting a bid or offer
on an exchange that is inside the spread between the preexisting NBO and
NBB, thereby, improving, respectively the NBB or the NBO, after which the
quote-maker sends a marketable order to a broker that will predictably send
it on to an internalizer whose pricing is based on this favorably altered NBB
or NBO.
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signals to facilitate various mechanisms of corporate
governance. Price accuracy of shares and liquidity of the
market they trade in act as useful proxies for these broad
social functions.30 Analytically, we develop an informal model
of the way in which the secondary equity market typically
behaves.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II
provides a more detailed description of spoofing. Part III
establishes our normative framework for evaluating whether
a potentially manipulative quoting strategy is genuinely
socially undesirable and whether the social benefits of
prohibiting the strategy outweigh the costs. There we identify
the ways in which spoofing and its regulation can affect the
efficiency with which the economy functions. We also explain
how we assess the fairness of a given practice. Part IV briefly
describes the basic institutional and economic features of the
stock market to provide the tools for understanding complex
quoting and trading strategies. For those familiar with our
recent work on various aspects of regulating stock markets,
Parts III and IV will be unnecessary.31 Part V assesses the
efficiency and fairness implications of spoofing. Parts VI and
VII deploy the analysis that precedes them to illuminate and
evaluate the existing statutory framework and case law
relating to spoofing. We then conclude.

30 See infra Section III.C. For a more in-depth discussion on how price
accuracy and liquidity act as such proxies, see FOX ET AL., THE NEW STOCK
MARKET, supra note 2, at 33–47.
31 Portions of these Parts draw significantly from more detailed
treatments in our prior work. See Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten &
Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65
DUKE L.J. 191, 217–26 (2015) [hereinafter Fox et al., Sense and Nonsense];
see also Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg,
Informed Trading and Its Regulation, 43 J. Corp. L. 817 (2018) [hereinafter
Fox et. al., Informed Trading]; Fox et al., Manipulation, supra note 2.
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II. OVERVIEW
A. Understanding Spoofing
Spoofing, as noted above, involves submitting to an
exchange one or more quotes for a large number of shares at
prices equal to, or less favorable than, the preexisting best
quote in the market. It depends on the following empirically
verified observations. Upon the arrival of an offer for a large
number of shares at a price equal to, or higher than, the preexisting NBO, market participants, absent a corresponding
increase in bids at or below the NBB, tend to react in the same
fashion as if bad news had arrived about the issuer.32
Similarly, upon the arrival of a bid for a large number of
shares at a price equal to, or lower than, the NBB, market
participants, absent a corresponding increase in offers at or
above the NBO, react in the same fashion as if good news
arrived about the issuer.33
The computer-based algorithmic trading programs of
HFTs appear to reflect this observation. As noted above, HFTs
are a major source of liquidity in the modern stock market,
posting a significant portion of the bid and offer quotes that
result in trades.34 These quotes constitute the prices at which
other traders can transact. HFTs revise their quotes at rapid
speeds based on information that they receive concerning
purchases and sales of shares that are occurring and changes
in quotes.35 HFTs can see and react very quickly when such
an offer or bid arrives and they can use this speed to their
advantage.36 In response to a new offer for a large number of
shares at or above the NBO, HFTs will cancel their bids. And
because they may well also wish to lower their offers to a level
at or below the pre-existing NBB, they are also likely to wish
to clear the market of remaining other bids, and the only way

32
33
34
35
36

See infra Section V.A.
See infra Section V.A.
See note 26 and accompanying text.
See FOX ET AL., THE New Stock Market, supra note 3, at 95.
See id.
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of doing this is to send in marketable sell orders to execute
against those bids. Because an HFT doing this believes that
the appropriate new offer price is at or below the pre-existing
NBB, sending in these bid-clearing sell orders would appear
costless to it since it is selling at a price at or above what it
now thinks is the right price at which to buy shares. 37
Spoofing is best understood through an example involving
a manipulator named Atlee. Immediately prior to Atlee’s first
move, the NBO for ABC shares is $10.12 and the NBB $10.10,
each for 1,500 shares. All of these existing quotes were
submitted by liquidity supplying HFTs. In the first stage of
the manipulation, Atlee starts by placing ten 100 share nonmarketable buy orders at $10.10. He immediately follows this
by placing a 5,000 share non-marketable sell limit order at
$10.12, constituting an addition of 5000 shares offered at this
price. This large order on the offer side induces the HFT
liquidity suppliers to cancel all their $10.10 bids, totaling 1500
shares. That leaves just Atlee’s bids for a total of 1,000 shares
at $10.10. The HFTs then submit sell limit orders at $10.10
for 1,000 shares, reflecting their belief that the price of ABC
shares is going to fall and that they will wish to quote offers
at $10.10 or below. These execute against Atlee’s $10.10 bids
for a total of 1,000 shares. Atlee immediately cancels his 5,000
share $10.12 offer, no part of which has been executed
against.38 So at this point, Atlee has bought 1,000 shares at
$10.10 and has no bids or offers outstanding.
Now Atlee enters the second stage of this manipulation,
reversing the strategy used in the first stage. He submits ten
100 share non-marketable sell limit orders at $10.12 and a
5,000 share non-marketable buy limit order at $10.10,
constituting an additional 5000 shares bid for at this price.
37 Even if the revised offer will be above the current NBB, $10.10, the
HFT’s expectation is that the sniping of shares at the existing bid may be
bought back profitably at what it expects to be a new NBB below $10.10.
38 Even if some market participants, slower to pick up on Atlee’s new
offers or their apparent significance, still put in marketable buy orders that
execute at $10.12, any quotes not yet cancelled by the HFT liquidity
suppliers will be first in line to be hit, likely leaving Atlee’s quote totally (as
assumed here), or at least mostly, unexecuted against.
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Again, the HFTs respond by cancelling their offers at
whatever price they are now set and submitting marketable
buy orders at $10.12 for 1000 shares, which execute against
Atlee’s ten 100 share offers at $10.12. Atlee then cancels his
5,000-share bid at $10.10, none of which has been executed
against.
Atlee is now flat, having first bought 1000 shares for
$10.10 and then sold 1000 shares at $10.12, collecting $20.00
all in a matter of milliseconds. He also likely collected rebates
of about $4.00 for the roundtrip transaction ($0.20 per
hundred shares times 2000/100).
Although $24 might not seem like much, the whole process
is automated and can be repeated in milliseconds for this
security and many others and on a repeated basis over time.
That this can work in ways that generate tens of millions of
dollars is evidenced by the cases that we will discuss in Parts
VI and VII. Its profit potential is also demonstrated by
empirical work that shows that large relative size at the offer
does predict a subsequent decline in the NBO and NBB and
large relative size at the bid does predict an increase in each.39

B. The Role of Purpose
In court opinions and legal commentary pertaining to
section 9(a)(2), a considerable amount turns on the “purpose”
of the transactions involved. Likewise, the concept of a
“manipulative . . . device” under section 10(b) signifies some
form of scienter, a legal concept that refers to intent. The
39 This was first pointed out in Huang and Stoll, which shows that
log(ask size/bid size) is negatively related to short term (five-minute) log
price changes. Roger Huang & Hans Stoll, Market Microstructure and Stock
Return Predictions, 7 REV OF FIN . S TUD . 179, 210 (1994). This qualitative
relation is confirmed in recent papers. Charles Cao, Oliver Hansch &
Xiaoxin Wang, The Information Content of an Open Limit-Order Book, 29 J.
FUTURE MKTS. 16, 16 (2009); Nikolaus Hautsch & Ruihong Huang, The
Market Impact of a Limit Order, 36 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 501, 501
(2012); see also Lawrence E. Harris & Venkatesh Panchapagesan, The
Information Content of The Limit Order Book: Evidence From NYSE
Specialist Trading Decisions, 8 J. FIN . MKTS . 25 (2005); Charles Cao, Oliver
Hansch & Xiaoxin Wang, Order Placement Strategies in a Pure Limit Order
Book Market, 31 J. FIN . RSCH. 113 (2008).
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intent of a spoofer such as Atlee, in his quoting activity on
each side of the book, is to influence the quoting and trading
behavior of others so that his actual purchase or sale can occur
at a favorable price. Determining the purpose for which a
given quote was submitted raises, of course, notoriously
complicated questions. Most critically, an individual’s purpose
in submitting a quote is inherently subjective. Thus,
practically speaking, two analytic questions are inseparable:
what establishes an improper purpose, and what establishes
adequate evidence of that improper purpose.
Before we can determine what evidence would be sufficient
to constitute an improper purpose for a quote, however, it is
crucial to have a cogent conceptual idea of what constitutes an
improper purpose. Consider an individual who submitted a
quote and not long after engages in an actual transaction
going in the opposite direction, cancelling the quote at about
the same time, but the reason is because she received new
information concerning either the prospects of the issuer or
concerning other quotes or trades relating to the issuer’s
shares. Or consider an individual who engages in the actual
transaction going the other way to improve her risk/return
ratio in response to some change involving other securities in
her portfolio that occurs after making the quote. We
presumably would not wish to prohibit such quoting even
though it may inevitably have had a favorable influence on
the price at which the actual transaction occurs. The
individual with whom we would potentially be concerned is
instead the individual who engages in the quoting behavior in
anticipation of an actual transaction going the other way and
solely for the purpose of executing this actual transaction at a
more favorable price. As we will explore further in Part V,
quoting behavior of this sort is socially undesirable.
This concept of what is socially undesirable quote-driven
manipulation is close to that adopted by Lawrence Harris for
what he considers socially undesirable trade-driven
manipulation by persons he calls “bluffers”:
The distinguishing difference between bluffers and
informed speculators is that the speculators trade on
opinions about fundamental values that they base on
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fundamental information. Bluffers behave as though
they are informed speculators, and they hope that
others will believe they are well-informed speculators,
but they do not have well-founded opinions about
values. Instead, they try to fool other traders into
thinking they do.40

It is also similar to a concept of trade-driven manipulation
recognized by Fischel and Ross:
(1) The trading is intended to move prices in a certain
direction; (2) the trader has no belief that the prices
would move in this direction but for the trade; and (3)
the resulting profit comes solely from the trader’s
ability to move prices and not from his possession of
valuable information.41

For quote-driven manipulation, the parallel idea would be
that the quote does not represent an assessment by the person
submitting it that having the quote executed against would,
at the time it was made, be to her advantage, and that the
quote was submitted solely with the intent of executing an
actual transaction going the other way solely to improve the
terms on which that transaction occurs.
Fischel and Ross, however, do not think that their concept
of trade-driven manipulation could be operationalized because
they think it is too difficult to obtain adequate evidence
concerning intent and that as a result any attempt would chill
too many legitimate, socially useful transactions.42 We have
disagreed with their belief in the case of trade-driven
manipulation and, as will be developed in this paper, we think
it is also possible to develop evidentiary tests suggesting that
a given sequence of quoting, transacting, and quote cancelling
associated with spoofing was undertaken for an improper
purpose. We share, however, their concern about chilling
socially useful market activities that are part of similarly

40

LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE
266 (2003).
Fischel & Ross, supra note 1, at 510.
See id. at 519, 522–23.

FOR PRACTITIONERS
41
42
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appearing sequences. Thus, these evidentiary tests need to be
designed to avoid such significant chilling.

III. THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
Analyzing the social value of a quoting strategy and
whether it should be prohibited as illegal manipulation
requires understanding the core functions served by the
equity trading market and the role that quoting plays in it.43
It also requires understanding that if a specific kind of quoting
occurs and its extent is generally understood, other actors in
the system will take its existence into account in determining
their own behavior. Thus, the normative question is how the
occurrence of a given quoting practice—and any attempts to
regulate it—affect the system’s ultimate ability to advance the
various social goals that equity trading markets serve and
that give rise to the justification for regulation when these
markets fall short.

A. Social Goals
Five key social goals motivate most discussion of secondary
equity markets44 and their regulation:
(i) promoting the efficient allocation of capital to the
most promising investment projects; (ii) furthering
the efficient use of the economy’s existing productive
capacity; (iii) advancing the efficient allocation of
resources between current and future periods; (iv)
promoting the efficient allocation of the risks
associated with volatility of issuers’ cash flows to risk43 Parts III and IV provide a brief overview of the normative framework
for assessing whether a given quoting strategy is socially undesirable and
the basic institutional and economic features of the stock market. More
detailed analysis is found in previous work referenced throughout by Fox,
Glosten, and Rauterberg. See generally, Fox et al., Manipulation, supra note
3; Fox et al., Sense and Nonsense, supra note 31, at 207–61; Fox et al.,
Informed Trading, supra note 31.
44 Primary markets are those where stocks are purchased from the
company issuing those stocks, while traders buy and sell stocks from each
other in the secondary market. Stock exchanges are secondary markets. FOX
ET AL., THE NEW STOCK MARKET, supra note 3, at 11.
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averse investors with the least disutility; and (v)
operating fairly and advancing a sense of fairness
throughout.45

In addition, any cogent analysis of quote manipulation and
its regulation must consider its impact on the real resources
that society devotes to trading in, and uses to operate, the
stock market.46 Enforcement and compliance costs
accompanying its regulation, including any socially beneficial
transactions that regulation may deter, must also be
considered.

B. The Use of Ex Post and Ex Ante Analysis
Analyzing the impact of an ongoing quoting practice on
these five core social goals is best understood by beginning
with a single instance of the quoting practice and evaluating
its ex post effect. From this, we can determine the impact of
the quoting activity on participants’ wealth positions, which
in turn reveals the incentives generated by the occurrence of
the practice. Then we can assess, from an ex ante perspective,
the impact of the activity as a known ongoing phenomenon
taking place over the long run within a competitive
environment. This ex ante analysis allows us to evaluate the
efficiency and fairness implications of the activity. As is fairly
standard in the law and economics literature, we consider
efficiency in Kaldor-Hicks terms,47 and evaluate fairness by

Fox et al., Manipulation, supra note 3, at 80.
Id.
47 See generally John R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics,
49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics
and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939) (together
establishing the Kaldor-Hicks conception of efficiency). The Kaldor-Hicks
conception of efficiency is still the standard welfare criterion in law-andeconomics analyses of corporate and securities law. Cf. John Armour et al.
What is Corporate Law? in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 23 n.87 (Reinier Kraakman et
al. eds., 3d ed. 2017).
45
46
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considering a practice’s effects on the wealth positions of
various participants from an ex ante perspective.48

C. Market Characteristics that Impact These Goals
A given quoting strategy may interact with these five social
goals in dynamic ways that relate to a stock market’s two most
critical characteristics: the price accuracy and the liquidity of
the stocks trading in it.49 The social impact of any kind of
quoting activity is best evaluated through a two-step process:
first analyzing the impact of the practice on these two market
characteristics and then determining the characteristic’s
effect on the five social goals.

1. Price Accuracy
Price accuracy refers to the accuracy with which the
market price of an issuer’s shares estimates the issuer’s future
cash flows.50 More accurate stock market prices will generate
a more efficient allocation of capital by funneling new capital
towards the issuers with the most promising real investment
projects, the first basic social goal.51 In addition, more
48 As developed in our previous work, many of the concerns around
fairness are best evaluated within an efficiency framework. Using an ex
ante perspective to evaluate fairness means that a practice is not unfair if
it does not affect a market participant’s expected outcomes—if a participant
is not worse off on average entering into trades due to the practice. See Fox
et al., Informed Trading, supra note 31, at 841.
49 THIERRY FOUCAULT, MARCO PAGANO & AILSA RÖELL, MARKET
LIQUIDITY: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY 31 (2013) (“The two main roles of
a securities market are to provide trading services for investors who wish to
alter their portfolios, and to determine prices that can guide the allocation
of capital by investors and firms. . . . [A] market is efficient if it enables
investors to trade quickly and cheaply (i.e., if it is liquid) and if it
incorporates new information quickly and accurately into prices.”).
50 See FOX ET AL., NEW STOCK MARKET, supra note 3, at 34.
51 For further detail, see Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 31,
at 833–34. See also Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory
Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 260–64 (2009) [hereinafter Fox, Civil
Liability and Mandatory Disclosure]; Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and
the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L. J. 977, 1005–16
(1992). See generally Qi Chen, Itay Goldstein & Wei Jiang, Price
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accurate share prices help reveal badly performing managers
and sharpen incentives for superior managerial decisionmaking with respect to the first two basic social goals.52 Over
time, more accurate share prices are also likely to increase
investors’ sense of fairness—a part of the fifth basic social
goal—because these investors will sustain fewer negative
surprises following their purchase or sale.53

2. Liquidity
Liquidity is a multi-dimensional concept that refers to the
size of a trade, the price at which the trade occurs, and the
time it takes to execute the trade. In general, the larger the
size of the trade and the more quickly one wishes to
accomplish it, the more inferior (higher for a buyer, lower for
a seller) the price will be. However, these tradeoffs will be less
severe the more liquid the market is. 54 Liquidity also interacts
with a number of social goals.55 Greater liquidity leads to
more efficient allocation of social resources over time, the
third social goal.56 By lowering transaction costs associated

Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price, 20 REV. FIN .
S TUDS . 619 (2007).
52 Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 51, at
258–60. There is plentiful empirical evidence to indicate that accurate price
signals do in fact enhance the efficiency of managerial decisions. See, e.g.,
FOUCAULT ET AL., supra note 49, at 361–68 (collecting relevant empirical
studies).
53 When a negative surprise occurs, it leads to grievance even though a
positive surprise was equally probable ex ante. See, e.g., DONALD C.
LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET,
AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 11 (2016).
54 For a small retail trade, the “bid-ask spread” is a useful measure of
liquidity because the trader can buy or sell instantly at those respective
prices and will basically be paying half the spread to do so. For larger orders,
the volume of shares available at prices not too inferior to the best bid or
offer (the “depth of the book”) is also relevant. See Fox et al., Informed
Trading, supra note 31.
55 For further detail, see Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 31,
at 834–35.
56 Id. The more liquid that investors believe an issuer’s shares will be
in the future, the higher the price at which the issuer can sell its shares (the
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with the purchase and sale of securities, more liquidity also
fosters more efficient allocation of risk, the fourth basic social
goal.57 Increased liquidity also increases share price accuracy
by reducing the transaction costs associated with
fundamental informed trading and spurring such activity,
with the associated benefits discussed above of increasing
efficient allocation of capital and use of existing productive
capacity—the first two social goals.58

IV. THE WORKINGS OF THE EQUITY MARKET
Assessing the impact of any particular quoting strategy on
price accuracy and liquidity requires a basic understanding of
how the equity market functions. This Part therefore supplies
a brief description that will provide a baseline understanding
of how the market would work in the absence of trade-based
or quote-based manipulation, which will in turn develop the
tools to understand the discussion in Part V as to the impact
of spoofing if it is present in the market.

A. Market Participants and Their Reasons for Trading
Traders in the market can be divided into several
categories: informed traders, uninformed traders, and pricesensitive fundamental value traders, among others.59
Professional suppliers of liquidity are also among the buyers
and sellers in the market. As will be developed in Part V, a
trader engaging in spoofing has a special kind of private
information: the knowledge that the quote she has submitted
into the market does not represent an assessment by her that
it would be advantageous for her to have her quote executed
against. This information in some ways makes her similar to
an informed trader when she engages in her actual purchase
more valuable those shares are), all else equal, which lowers the issuer’s
cost of capital.
57 Id.
58 See Fox et al., Manipulation, supra note 3, at 53.
59 While dividing traders into informed and uninformed is a basic tool
of microstructure economics, our taxonomy is much indebted to Larry
Harris’s work. See HARRIS, TRADING & EXCHANGES, supra note 40, at 194.
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or sale. The baseline depiction of the market that follows,
however, assumes that no traders are carrying out any type of
quote or trade-based manipulation.

1. Informed Traders
Informed traders transact based on information that
provides them with a more accurate assessment of the stock’s
value than the assessment implied by the stock’s current
market price.60 This information can take several forms.
Fundamental-value information estimates an issuer’s future
cash flows discounted to present value and is generated by
gathering pieces of publicly available information about the
world and analyzing that information, leading to a superior
appraisal of those cash flows.61 Announcement information
appears in an announcement by an issuer or other institution
with clear implications for the issuer’s future cash flows, and
is only profitable during the short period of time between the
announcement and when the information is fully reflected in
the price.62 Issuer inside information is non-public
information held within an issuer that is not yet reflected in
price but is relevant to its future cash flows.63 Non-issuer
inside information is non-public information relevant to
predicting an issuer’s future cash flows that is not yet
reflected in price and held within an institution other than an
issuer.64
Two of us have concluded elsewhere that informed trading
makes share prices on average more accurate, but reduces
liquidity.65 Thus it is necessary to net out the tradeoff between
the positive social impact resulting from increased share price
accuracy and the negative social impact resulting from
lowered liquidity. We have also concluded elsewhere that
See id.; Fox et al, Informed Trading
Id.
62 Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 31, at 846.
63 Id. at 847.
64 Id. at 858.
65 See Fox et al., Manipulation, supra note 2, at 87; see also infra
Section IV.C.
60
61
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fundamental value informed trading is socially desirable,
while trading on the basis of announcement information,
issuer inside information and non-issuer inside information
(unless permitted by the non-issuer institution that developed
the information) are all socially undesirable.66

2. Uninformed Traders
Uninformed traders buy and sell shares without holding
information that provides a more accurate estimate of the
stock’s value than the assessment that current market prices
imply.67 An uninformed trade can be motivated by various
reasons, including deferring consumption until a later period,
rebalancing portfolios, or even gambling.68 These transactions
are not motivated by information yet to be reflected in the
share price at the time of the transaction.69

3. Price Sensitive Fundamental Value Traders
Each price-sensitive fundamental value trader has her
own reservation price for buying and selling a given stock.
That reservation price is a product of her own best estimate of
the issuer’s future cash flows based on her specific analysis of
already publicly available information, how much exposure
she already has to the issuer’s shares, and a discount to reflect
the possibility that what appears to be an attractive purchase
or sale price might be the result of informed trading.70 Often
these fundamental value traders are traders who, though not
in the business of supplying liquidity like professional
liquidity suppliers, have submitted non-marketable limit
orders.71 Thus, they are showing that they are interested in

See Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 31, at 834–35.
Id. at 827; HARRIS, TRADING & EXCHANGES, supra note 40, at 194.
68 See Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 31, at 827; HARRIS ,
TRADING & EXCHANGES, supra note 40, at 194–95.
69 See Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 31, at 827.
70 See MERRITT B. FOX, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE :
THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY 34–43, 55–57 (1987).
71 FOX ET AL., THE NEW STOCK MARKET, supra note 3, at 64.
66
67
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buying or selling shares of an issuer, but only if they can do so
at a more favorable price than the current NBO or NBB.

4. Professional Liquidity Suppliers
Professional liquidity suppliers both frequently purchase
and sell an issuer’s shares, generating a business from being
willing to buy and sell these shares up to stated amounts at
quoted prices.72 Today, this is typically a proprietary HFT. An
HFT uses high-speed communications to continuously update
its information about others’ transactions and quotes
occurring in each stock that it frequently trades and revises
its own quotes accordingly, rather than relying on information
about the issuer itself to set these quotes.73

B. Trading Venues and Orders
Any stock is potentially traded in each of several competing
venues. As previewed in Part I, almost all these venues are
electronic limit order books, where a liquidity supplier or a
trader can post, as a limit order, its firm commitment to buy
or sell up to a specified number of shares at a quoted price. 74
This limit order remains posted on an exchange until it is
either executed against or canceled.75 The price of the lowestpriced sell limit order or orders posted on any exchange in the
country is the national best offer (NBO).76 The price of the
highest-priced buy order or orders posted on any exchange in
the country is the national best bid (NBB).77 A computer (the

See Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 31, at 827–28.
The professional liquidity supplier is not “informed” in the sense
used here. Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 31, at 828. Because of
its unique intermediary market making role, in contrast to all other buyers
and sellers of securities in the market, we will not refer to it as a “trader.”
Id.
74 Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 31, at 828; FOX ET AL., THE
NEW STOCK MARKET, supra note 3, at 13.
75 Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 31, at 828; FOX ET AL., THE
NEW STOCK MARKET, supra note 3, at 13.
76 Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 31, at 828.
77 Id.
72
73
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venue’s matching engine) matches posted limit orders with
incoming buy and sell marketable orders.78 A marketable
order can be a market order or a marketable limit order. 79 A
market order is an order from a trader willing to trade
immediately and unconditionally at the best available price in
the market.80 A marketable limit order, if a buy order, has a
limit price at or above the NBO, and so, on its terms, can
execute immediately against a posted limit order with the
NBO. For the same reasons, a sell limit order is marketable if
its limit price is at or below the NBB.81 The limit orders posted
on exchanges and which constitute the available quotes in the
market are referred to as non-marketable limit orders.82 These
are posted since they do not execute immediately upon
submission. This is because, if they are sell limit orders, they
are above the NBB, and if they are buy limit orders, they are
below the NBO.83 The law requires as a general matter that a
venue not allow a marketable order to execute on it if that
venue’s own best offer is above the NBO or its own best bid is
below the NBB.84 Instead, the venue will usually send the
order to an exchange posting orders at the NBO or NBB.85
HFTs, acting as professional liquidity suppliers, post a
significant portion of the non-marketable limit orders that

FOX ET AL., THE NEW STOCK MARKET, supra note 3, at 13.
Id. at 21.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 22.
83 Id. at 21–22.
84 See Order Protection Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 242.611(a)(1) (2021).
85 See Memorandum from the SEC Div. of Trading and Mkts. to the
SEC Mkt. Structure Advisory Comm. 6 (April 30, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/emsac/memo-rule-611-regulation-nms.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5UUN-3SX2] (“If a broker-dealer routes an order to a
trading venue that cannot execute the order at the best price, the venue
cannot simply execute the order at an inferior price. It can either cancel the
order back to the broker-dealer or route the order to another venue that will
execute the order at the best price or better.”).
78
79
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constitute the quotes in the market.86 Still, any trader can
also submit a non-marketable limit order, which also becomes
a quote.

C. The Economics of Liquidity Provision
A liquidity supplier faces a classic adverse selection
situation87 and will, on average, lose money when it buys at
the bid from informed sellers or sells at the offer to informed
buyers.88 This is because the informed trader has information
suggesting that there are expected profits from entering into
a transaction at the liquidity supplier’s price.89 Trading is a
zero-sum game, so if the informed trader has expected profits
from the trade, the liquidity supplier will have expected
losses. However, the liquidity provider can still break even, as
long as enough transactions occur with uninformed traders.90
These transactions are on average profitable.91 This is
because the offer—the price at which the liquidity supplier
sells shares—is higher than the bid—the price at which they
are bought, and the uninformed trader possesses no
information suggesting expected profits from buying or selling
the shares at the offer and bid, respectively.92 For the liquidity
supplier to break even, there simply needs to be a wide enough
spread between the bid and offer such that the losses from

86 See Brogaard, Hendershott & Riordan, supra note 26, at 2273–74
(finding that HFTs provide liquidity for forty-two percent of all trades and
supply the market quotes forty-two percent of the time).
87 See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON . 488, 488–93 (1970)
(the seminal article examining how informational asymmetries can spur
declines in the quality of market goods until the market unravels and only
low quality “lemons” remain). For a parallel application in the securities
markets, see Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing
and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do
Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 187 (1984).
88 F OX ET AL ., T HE NEW S TOCK M ARKET supra note 3, at 65–66.
89 Id.
90 Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 31, at 829.
91 Id.
92 See id.
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transacting against informed traders are offset by the profits
from transacting against uninformed traders.93
If a liquidity supplier rationally anticipates a higher
incidence of informed trading, it will raise its offers and lower
its bids to survive in a competitive market.94 Moreover, the
actions of rational liquidity providers thus act as a kind of
“invisible hand”: as a result of their work to avoid losses to
informed traders, liquidity providers, in reaction to changes
in quotes and new marketable orders, are constantly revising
their quotes so that, over time, those quotes fully reflect the
information in informed trades.95 Empirical evidence
supports these theoretical results.96
This Part provided a brief baseline of how securities
markets would work if there were no spoofing. Against this
baseline, Part V will assess the impact if spoofing does occur
in the market. Until now, we have assumed that, for
explanatory simplicity, all the non-marketable limit orders
posted on trading venues are submitted by HFT professional
liquidity suppliers and all traders use market orders. In fact,
many traders also use non-marketable limit orders. In the
absence of quote manipulators, the introduction of this
complication does not by itself change the conclusions in any
important way. What Part V explores is what happens when

For a more in-depth model of how the bid-ask spread is set, see F OX
THE NEW S TOCK MARKET supra note 3, at 66–69.
94 F OX ET AL ., Id. at 68–69. Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom,
Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with
Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN . ECON . 71 (1985) (setting forth
a model of trading behavior under information asymmetries in securities
markets).
95 See Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 31, at 831.
96 See Kalok Chan, Y. Peter Chung & Herb Johnson, The Intraday
Behavior of Bid-Ask Spreads for NYSE Stocks and CBOE Options, 30 J. FIN.
& QUANT. ANAL. 329, 332–43, (1995) (indicating that adverse selection
provides an important determinant of the intraday behavior of bid-ask
spreads); Lawrence R. Glosten & Lawrence E. Harris, Estimating the
Components of the Bid-Ask Spread, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 123 (1988) (developing
a model in which the bid-ask spread is separated into an adverse selection
component and a transitory component due to inventory costs, clearing
costs, and other factors).
93

ET AL .,

No. 3:1244]

SPOOFING AND ITS REGULATION

1273

some of the traders who submit non-marketable limit orders—
i.e., submit quotes—are spoofers.

V. SPOOFING
Recall that spoofing involves submitting one or more
quotes to an exchange, each quote for a large number of shares
at a price equal to, or less favorable than, the pre-existing best
quote in the market.97 The practice is based on the
observation, confirmed by empirical studies, that the arrival
of an offer for a large number of shares at a price equal to, or
higher than, the pre-existing NBO, is followed by market
participants acting in the same manner as if bad news had
arrived about the issuer; and the observation that the arrival
of a bid for a large number of shares at a price equal to, or
lower than, the NBB, is followed by market participants
acting in the same manner as if good news arrived about the
issuer.98
The analysis below suggests that spoofing is a market
practice that gives rise to an affirmative answer to each of the
four foundational questions posed at the beginning, and hence
is an appropriate target of a ban under the Exchange Act. It
is socially harmful in a way that makes it distinguishable as
a conceptual matter from other trading strategies. It fits
under a broad dictionary meaning of the word “manipulation.”
The practice can yield positive expected profits. And there are
identifiable, objectively observable factors that can serve as a
condition for imposing legal sanctions on undesirable quotes
while minimizing prosecution of socially desirable quotes.
Our analysis backing up these conclusions, set out below,
is built on the Atlee example in Part II. Recall that at the
start, the NBO for ABC shares is $10.12 and the NBB $10.10,
each for 1500 shares. All these quotes were submitted by
liquidity supplying HFTs. Atlee places ten 100 share nonmarketable buy orders at $10.10, immediately followed by
placing a 5,000 share non-marketable sell limit order at
$10.12. This large order on the offer side induces the HFT
97
98

See supra Part II.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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liquidity suppliers to cancel all their $10.10 bids and to submit
sell limit orders at $10.10 for 1000 shares. These moves reflect
their belief that the share price will fall and, consequently,
their desire to clear out the remaining bids at $10.10 so that
they can submit new offers at that price or lower. The HFTs’
marketable sell orders execute against Atlee’s total of 1000
share bids at $10.10 bid. Atlee immediately cancels his 5,000
share $10.12 offer, all or almost all of which has not been
executed against. Atlee then enters into a mirror-image set of
actions. In the roundtrip, Atlee collected $20.00 (buying 1000
shares at $10.10 and selling them at $10.12), all in a matter
of milliseconds. Atlee has also likely collected rebates of about
$4.00 from the exchanges for sending them 1000 nonmarketable buy, and 1000 non-marketable sell, limit orders
$4.00 ($.20 per hundred shares times 2000/100). Unless there
are other developments in the market during the very brief
time of this two-sided manipulation, the bid and offer should
return very quickly to $10.10 and $10.12, respectively.
Below, we start by assessing the wealth transfer
implications of spoofing. That starts with examining the ex
post effects of what Atlee did. Making trading profits is a zerosum game: Atlee made positive trading profits so someone else
lost money. After this ex post analysis, we consider, from an
ex ante perspective, what the impact of the practice is as a
generally known ongoing phenomenon occurring over the
longer run within a competitive environment. From this, we
can make conclusions about the efficiency implications of the
practice in terms of liquidity and share price accuracy, as well
as the fairness of its impact on different members of society.
Finally, we consider whether there are practical ways of
deterring this practice without at the same time chilling a
significant amount of socially useful activity, and whether,
instead of relying on a legal prohibition, there is a mechanism
in the market which generates self-protection that would be
better to rely on.

A. Why Does Spoofing Work?
The question of why spoofing works has been explored in
some recent market microstructure theory. One possible
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approach goes as follows. The equilibrium in a limit order
book derived in the standard microstructure models assumes
a world with continuous prices.99 Real world exchanges,
though, have a minimum tick size, typically a penny, 100 and
use time priority (first in, first out) to determine which quotes
at the same price get executed against first.101 A limit order
book with these features will have the offer side of the book as
an upward step function approximation of a market with a
continuous price range of prices. The bid side of the book will
be a downward step function approximation of the same
market.
In this world with a penny tick, there would still be a
consensus as to the “true” offer price, bid price, and mid-point
price, i.e., the ones that would have prevailed if prices had in
fact been continuous. No liquidity supplier will be willing to
sell at or below this true offer price, or buy at or above this
true bid price. As a result, if the true offer price is close to, but
below, the NBO, the offer size will be small relative to where
it would have been if it were close to, but above, the next tick
below the NBO. Conversely, if the true bid price were close to,
but below, the next tick above the NBB, the bid size will be
large relative to where it would have been if it were close to,
but just above, the NBB.
To illustrate, when manipulators such as Atlee are absent,
if the NBO and NBB remain unchanged but there is an
increase in the number of shares offered at the NBO relative
to the number bid at the NBB, this would suggest a drop in
the true midpoint price. Consider the following example. At
the start, the NBO for ABC shares is $10.12, with 1500 shares
offered, and the NBB is $10.10, with 1500 shares bid. Assume

99 Lawrence R. Glosten, Is the Electronic Open Limit Order Book
Inevitable?, 49 J. FIN. 1127, 1128 (1994).
100 Minimum Pricing Increment, 17 C.F.R. § 242.612 (2021)
101 Explaining
Parity/Priority,
N.Y.
STOCK.
EXCH.,
https://www.nyse.com/article/parity-priority-explainer
[https://perma.cc/UGU7-X8JK] (last visited Dec. 23, 2021) (“Most securities
markets operate on the basis of Price/Time priority. This means that orders
are executed based on best price, and if multiple orders are at the same
price, an order with an earlier time trades first.”).
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that this reflects the true offer price for ABC shares being
$10.115 and the true bid price being $10.105, with the
midpoint being $10.11 and the implied spread in the
continuous market being $.01. Next, the number of shares
offered at $10.12 increases relative to the number bid at
$10.00. These respective changes in the number of shares
offered and bid would imply a downward valuation of ABC
shares in the market, because, if such a downward valuation
occurred, it would be attractive to more people to sell ABC
shares at $10.12 and attractive to fewer of them to buy them
at $10.10.
This step-function theory cannot be the whole story,
however. First, this theory only relates to changes in the “true
offer” and “true bid” price within a single tick, whereas the
HFT behavior that leads to spoofing yielding expected profits
depends on HFTs inferring, from changes in size at the NBO
or NBB, changes in valuation greater than just within a single
tick.102 Second, at least two empirical studies suggest that
extra size at a tick above the NBO also leads to a subsequent
decrease on average in the NBO and NBB, and the reverse for
extra size a tick below the NBB. 103 The step function theory
102 Hautsch and Huang, based on Euronext Amsterdam data, estimate
that a 50% increase in the size at the offer leads on average to a half basis
point decrease in the NBB and NBO (and the opposite reaction to a
comparable increase at the bid) within about 10 units of event time (i.e. 10
order arrivals). This is half of a tick for a $100 stock. In contrast, a
comparable increase in marketable orders (sell orders at the NBB and buy
orders at the NBO) has about a 2.5 basis point effect on the price. Hautsch
& Huang, supra note 39, at 513.
103 Early studies, Huang & Stoll, supra note 39, were constrained by
the fact that the authors did not have access to necessary data concerning
quote away from the NBBO. More recently, data has become available from
Euronext and the Australian Stock Exchange. See Hautsch & Huang, supra
note 39 (Euronext Amsterdam); see also Cao et al., supra note 39 (Australian
Stock Exchange). Both papers agree with the results of the earlier studies,
Huang & Stoll, supra note 39, that added size at the NBO leads on average
to a subsequent decrease in the NBO and NBB, and added size NBB leads
to the opposite result. See Hautsch & Huang, supra note 39, at 511; Cao et
al., supra note 39, at 125, 127. But, more to the point, these two newer
papers also agree with each other that, extra size placed one tick above the
NBO, or below the NBB has a smaller, but still significant impact on the
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has nothing to say about these results. In this connection,
cases brought against some alleged manipulators who have
reaped substantial gains from their pattern of quoting and
trading have, as part of this pattern, substantial additions to
quotes above the NBO and below the NBB, not just at the
NBO and NBB.104 This suggests that the alleged quote
manipulators believed that market participants infer changes
in the value of securities from increases in the size of quotes
away from NBO and NBB, not just from increases at the NBO
and NBB.105
We are not aware of any formally worked out
microstructure theory that perfectly describes why, in a
market with a minimum tick size, added size away from the
NBO or NBB has predictive power as to the value of the
security in the direction indicated both by the empirical
literature and by the profitable actions of spoofers themselves.
We can, however, make a few observations that together can
help understand what is going on. On the one hand, a trader
with negative private information would rather sell for more
than for less, which, in isolation, could explain why the trader
might post non-marketable limit orders both at and above the
NBO, and not just submit marketable orders at the NBB (as
well as the mirror image of this for a trader with positive
private information). On the other hand, an offer to sell at
NBO and NBB in the same directions, respectively, as added size at the
NBO or NBB. See Hautsch & Huang, supra note 39, at 511; Cao et al., supra
note 39, at 136 tbl.8. The papers’ respective results for an increase in size
two ticks or more from the NBO or NBB are more mixed. Hautsch and
Huang show that such additions to size predict a statistically positive, but
economically insignificant, change in the NBB and NBO in the same
direction as an increase in size at the NBO or NBB or at one tick away of
either. See Hautsch & Huang, supra note 39, at 513. However, Cao et al.
show that in a sample of 100 stocks, 30% or less of the estimated coefficients
for two ticks away have the “anticipated” sign (that is an increase in size
two ticks above the best offer leading to price decreases and an increase in
size two ticks below the best bid leading to price increases). See Cao et al.,
supra note 39, at 136 tbl.8.
104 See Complaint, SEC v. Lek Sec. Corp., No. 17CV1789(DLC), 2018
WL 417596 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2018).
105 See United States v. Coscia, 177 F. Supp. 3d 1087 (N.D. Ill. 2016);
Complaint at 2, SEC v. Milrud, No. 15-cr-00455 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2015).
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above the NBO may also suggest to the market there is
someone out there who values the stock for more than the
NBO and so would only sell if she got some higher price. And
market participants, in assessing the likelihood as to which of
these two kinds of traders put in the quote, will assume that
the more the quote is above the NBO, the less likely it is that
it was submitted from a negatively informed trader. This is
because a negatively informed trader will know that because
of competition among traders wishing to sell, the farther a
quote is above the NBO, the less likely it will be executed
against (the same proposition being true in mirror image
fashion for quotes below the NBB by positively informed
investors).106
These observations can be put together to tell the following
informal but plausible story, which both explains the
empirical studies showing that large size in quotes away from
the best (above the NBO or below the NBB) predict a
subsequent change in the NBO and NBB and provides a
supplementary explanation in addition to the step-function
theory for explaining as well the large-order-at-the-best-quote
phenomenon exemplified by the Atlee example.107 We will tell
this story in terms of quotes above the NBO, but it applies
equally well for quotes below the NBB. In this story, think
about a trader who would prefer to sell at the NBB (i.e., use a
marketable order) than to keep holding the stock in the longer
run, but who would, of course, prefer to dispose of her shares
for some higher price. This trader might be informed with
negative information, or she might be uninformed and selling
for idiosyncratic reasons such as a consumption need or
portfolio rebalancing. Suppose further that the trader believes

106 For a model that does not fully describe what we observe empirically
in real world markets with minimum tick sizes, but which incorporate some
or all of these observations, see Ronald L. Goettler, Christine A. Parlour &
Uday Rajan, Informed Traders and Limit Order Markets, 93 J. FIN. ECON.
67 (2009). For a model that in fact suggests behavior contrary to what we
observe in the real world, see Michael Brolley & Katya Malinova, Informed
Liquidity Provision in a Limit Order Market, 52 J. FIN. MKTS. (2021).
107 We thank Christine Parlour for helping in our efforts to understand
this. She, of course, bears no responsibility for the final product.
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that there is not much competition to sell, either because she
is informed and thinks others will not learn what she knows
soon, or she is uninformed and does not believe her
idiosyncratic desire to sell is felt at the same time by many
others. Such a trader might try the following strategy. First,
she places a sell order a tick away from the market. If that
order does not execute fairly quickly, she cancels it and
replaces it with a non-marketable limit order at the NBO.
Finally, if that order does not execute, she cancels it and
submits a marketable sell order at the NBB.
If everyone followed this strategy all the time, then one
would expect that the informational content of the tick away
orders would be roughly the same as at the market orders and
marketable orders. However, empirical studies based on
Euronext Amsterdam data suggest that the effect of a 50%
increase in marketable orders is on average a roughly 2 basis
point (bps) subsequent change in the NBO and NBB.108 The
comparable effect for non-marketable orders at the NBO is
about .5 bps, the comparable effect at one tick above the NBO
is about .2 bps, and the comparable effect at two ticks above
the NBO is about zero. 109 We suspect that this pattern is in
part the product both of the fact that some sellers are more
anxious to sell than our hypothetical seller described above,
with one reason being that they are informed traders with
information that is particularly negative or not likely to stay
private for long. The pattern is in part also probably due to
the fact that for some persons who submit quotes a tick or
more above the NBO, it is because they value the stock for
more than the NBO.
In any event, whether the step function theory and our
suggestive story are correct explanations of the market’s
response to a large order at or away from the NBO, market
participants act as though someone has new negative
information about the issuer, and this strongly suggests that
in fact such orders are signals that this is the case.

108
109

Hautsch & Huang, supra note 39, at 513.
Id.
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B. Wealth Transfers: Fairness and Efficiency
Considering the fairness and efficiency effects of spoofing
starts with examining the ex post effects of what Atlee did.
This is followed by a look at the practice from an ex ante
perspective, considering the impact of the practice as a
generally known ongoing phenomenon occurring over the long
run within a competitive environment. We can then draw
conclusions both about the efficiency implications of the
practice in terms of liquidity and share price accuracy and the
fairness of its impact on different members of society.

1. Assessing the Impact of the Practice from an Ex
Post Perspective
The distributive question is—who has benefited from this
activity and who has been harmed? Since secondary market
trading in pursuit of profits is a zero-sum game,110 gains and
losses by different market participants are mirror images of
each other and must sum to zero. Atlee made $20 in trading
profits. He purchased 1000 shares for $10.10 and sold them
for $10.12. The losers were HFTs, that, as a group, lost $20.
They were induced into selling 1000 shares for $10.10 and
buying 1000 shares at $10.12 when they otherwise would not
have. No one else is affected in this simple story.111
110 See L ARRY H ARRIS , T RADING AND E LECTRONIC M ARKETS : WHAT
I NVESTMENT PROFESSIONALS NEED TO KNOW 2 (2015) (suggesting that
“[t]rading is a zero-sum game when gains and losses are measured relative
to the market index”).
111 In our simple story, no one else is affected. It is, of course, possible,
for example, that some marketable sell orders submitted by ordinary
traders by chance arrive in the very brief time before the HFTs execute
against Atlee’s $10.10 bid, but that would just dilute the effect of Atlee’s
manipulation since he would simply be providing liquidity to these sellers
at the price that the non-manipulated market suggested was appropriate.
There also could be, in addition to Atlee’s bids at $10.10, other bids
submitted by ordinary traders willing to be patient in hopes of being able to
buy at a lower price than the offer. These traders, who move more slowly
than HFTs and thus would not cancel their bids, would, in the end, be happy
to have their bids executed against, but selling to these ordinary investors
just adds to the losses that the HFTs will suffer from the manipulation,
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2. Ex Ante Perspective
Now assume—not unrealistically—that all the players
have unbiased (though not necessarily accurate) expectations
concerning the prevalence of successful spoofing, and that all
the players operate within a competitive environment. We
want to compare what the long run equilibrium would look
like in a world where such a quoting strategy is occurring
freely with a world where it is somehow blocked. The object is
to see how the availability of the practice affects the wealth
positions of the various participants and the implications of
these effects in terms of fairness and, through the incentives
they create, on efficiency.

a. Spoofers
Spoofers will generate positive trading profits from
engaging in the practice. The resources necessary to conduct
such a business are a combination of ordinary and specialized
inputs. The ordinary inputs are physical, organizational, and
financial assets that could equally as usefully be utilized
elsewhere in the economy. The specialized inputs are the
efforts of persons who have abilities and skills uniquely
suitable for predicting and acting on such situations. All of
these inputs will be put into this business up to the point
where, at the margin, the expected profits from successfully
predicting and acting on such situations are equal to the costs
of paying for the inputs. This activity occurs in an openly
competitive environment; so the suppliers of the ordinary
inputs will be paid a market return comparable to what they
would earn if the resources they supplied were utilized
elsewhere. Thus, whether spoofing occurs freely or not has no
effect on their wealth positions. The persons with uniquely
useful abilities and skills will be paid greater rents than they
since they would need to clear out these bids as well as those of Atlee in
order to be able to submit offers at or below $10.10. It is also possible that
the NBB would decline very, very briefly before Atlee’s mirror set of actions
but, in that case, so would the offer. So, a few ordinary trader sellers might
suffer ex post losses, but a few buyers would enjoy ex post gains of a
comparable amount. The mirror set of actions will have the opposite effects.
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would otherwise be paid if they had to work in a different
business because spoofing was somehow prohibited. Thus,
their wealth positions will be enhanced if spoofing is allowed
to occur freely.112

b. Liquidity Suppliers
Viewing the effects of spoofing on liquidity suppliers from
an ex- ante perspective requires attention to two different
phenomena. One is the trading losses that the suppliers
sustain when they sell at a price equal to the pre-existing bid
and buy back at one equal to the pre-existing offer. The other
is the damage that the manipulation does to the information
environment that liquidity suppliers use to protect
themselves in their quoting activity against adverse selection
by informed traders.

i. Trading Losses
As we have seen from the example, ex post, liquidity
suppliers will lose in their transactions with a successful
spoofer because the reversing purchases from the
manipulators are at higher prices than the initial sales.
Who ultimately bears these costs, however, is an
interesting question. For the HFTs, these are not ordinary
adverse selection costs that arise from liquidity supply, selling
to investors with private positive information and buying from
ones with private negative information. This point is best
understood by considering an alternative scenario where
Atlee would be creating adverse selection costs through his
manipulation. Suppose Atlee did not put in his bids totaling
1000 shares at $10.10, but did put in his large quote at $10.12.
The large quote sent a sufficiently negative signal that it
pushed prices down by more than the spread so that the new
NBO, say $10.09, was below the pre-existing NBB of $10.10.
In this scenario, Atlee then buys at the new offer. After

112 This is the same analysis that two us have previously applied to
naked open market manipulation. See Fox et al., Manipulation.
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canceling the large quote, the bid returns to $10.10, and Atlee
sells the shares for $10.10 that he bought for $10.09.
In this alternative scenario, Atlee would, in essence, be an
informed trader because he would know that the large quote
at the NBO did not represent bad news when predictably
other market players would think that it did. From the ex ante
perspective, losses of that sort would be passed on by the
liquidity suppliers to the other traders in the market. In a
simple model, like that set out in Part IV, where the only cost
to liquidity supply is adverse selection, to survive in a
competitive market, a liquidity supplier must set its bids and
offers so that these losses and gains balance out.113 If its
spreads are wider than this, it will not attract orders because
they will be undercut by other liquidity suppliers. If they are
narrower than this, at least some of its inputs will be receiving
less than a market return, and thus the business will not be
able to survive in the longer run.
In contrast, in the Atlee scenario that is, in fact, our focus,
where he does submit the ten 100 share bids at $10.10, the
HFTs’ losses, rather than coming directly from their liquidity
supplying activity, arise because the HFTs choose not to wait
until marketable sell orders by ordinary investors executed
against the bids in the market at $10.10 submitted by persons
whom the HFTs (incorrectly) thought were just ordinary
traders (not professional liquidity suppliers) who had
submitted non-marketable buy orders at $10.10 and failed to
cancel because they were unaware of Atlee’s large order at the
pre-existing NBO and its negative implications. The HFTs
make this choice to clear the market themselves in these kinds
of situations in essence as an opportunity to expand their
businesses by quoting during a period of time that they
otherwise would not have been because there would still be
bids at or above the price at which they wish to quote offers.
So, the choice by an HFT to engage in this kind of activity is
more like a larger overall cost of business-related to how much
quoting they can provide during the year.

113

See supra Section IV.C.
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The existence of spoofing is thus more like other real-world
costs of being in the liquidity supply business not captured by
the simple, pure adverse selection model. These would include
what must be paid to personnel, a market return on the
capital needed for acquiring real estate and equipment and for
engaging in the trading itself, and compensation for the
undiversified nature of the portfolio that the business will be
holding most of the time. At least over the long run, the spread
must be wide enough to cover these costs as well for liquidity
suppliers to stay in business and provide liquidity at the level
they do, or it must erode what are still positive rents for
particular inputs into what is a competitive business. In other
words, spoofing is a cost of providing liquidity at this level,
which may or may not be passed on through a wider spread.

ii. Detecting Informed Trading
The presence of spoofing in the market has a more indirect
effect on liquidity suppliers, however, because it makes the
incidence of informed trading harder to detect. Although, as
noted above, we are not sure of the exact mechanisms, the
very fact that large orders at or away from the best quote
predict price changes indicates that such orders are a signal
that informed trading is going on. If spoofing is occurring from
time to time in the market, this signal gets muddied. When
the liquidity supplier sees a large quote at or above the NBO
(or at or below the NBB), it cannot be sure whether this is due
to informed trading or manipulation.
The worse liquidity suppliers are at detecting the incidence
of informed trading, the less able they are to protect
themselves against adverse selection losses by changing their
quotes in response to what they learn.114 This means that the
spread is wider because liquidity suppliers anticipate more in
the way of adverse selection losses. In accordance with the
simple model in Part IV, this clearly will be a cost that will be
passed on to traders in the form of a wider spread.

iii. Ultimate Incidence of the Negative
114

FOX ET AL., THE NEW STOCK MARKET, supra note 3, at 65–75.
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Effects on Liquidity Suppliers
To the extent, if any, that the trading losses associated
with spoofing cannot be passed on to traders in the form of a
higher spread, they will have a direct negative effect on
persons associated with the business by reducing the rents
they receive for their participation.
To the extent that liquidity suppliers can pass on—through
a wider spread—the trading costs to them associated with
spoofing, they will still have a negative effect on the wealth
positions of certain persons associated with the liquidity
supply business, but only indirectly. The same goes for the
negative effect of the manipulation on liquidity suppliers’
ability to detect informed trading and protect themselves in
their quoting activity.115 A wider spread increases the cost of
trading.116 This means that less trading occurs.117 Less
trading means less of both their ordinary and specialized
inputs will be pulled into the business. 118 Suppliers of the
ordinary inputs will earn the same ordinary market return
whatever the level of liquidity supply activity.119 For persons
with abilities and skills uniquely useful for liquidity supply,
however, they will be paid less in rents and so their wealth
positions will be negatively affected by the prospect of
successful manipulation of this type.120

c. Uninformed Traders
In the simple story that we tell in the Atlee example,
uninformed investors are not directly involved because the
whole manipulation takes so little time. Thus, few if any of
their marketable orders would, for example, execute against
Atlee’s $10.10 bids and if any did, they would receive the same
price as if the manipulation had not occurred. It is possible

115
116
117
118
119
120

See supra Section V.C.2.b.ii.
FOX ET AL., THE NEW STOCK MARKET, supra note 3, at 54.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See supra Section IV.A.4.
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that the NBB would decline briefly before Atlee’s mirror set of
actions but, in that case, so would the NBO. Therefore, where
sellers might lose, buyers would win by a comparable amount.
From an ex ante point of view, an uninformed investor is as
likely to be a buyer as a seller, hence, on an expected basis the
impact to uninformed investors of manipulation is zero.
Moreover, the mirror set of actions will have the opposite
effects on buyers versus sellers, but again, there is no impact
on an expected basis.
The expected cost to uninformed traders from spoofing is
instead indirect. It arises from the need, in the cycle of a
purchase and sale, to pay any increase in spread because this
kind of manipulation is occurring. They will purchase at the
offer but only be able to sell at the bid. Calculating the
ultimate incidence of this cost on uninformed traders is a bit
complicated, however. When an issuer’s entrepreneurs and
initial investors engage in an initial public offering, the shares
they are offering will be discounted to reflect the prospect that
the spread must be paid with each subsequent sale and
purchase in the secondary market as well as the prospect that
any future equity offerings by the issuer over time will be
similarly discounted.121 Thus, the entrepreneurs and early
investors receive less than if there were no impact on the
spread by this kind of manipulation. This discount continues
at the same level for as long as the firm appears to have a long
run future. For uninformed investors who buy and sell less
frequently than average, this discount makes the purchase a
bargain and so they are gainers from spoofing. Those who buy
and sell more frequently than average122 are hurt by
repeatedly paying the spread more than they benefit from the
discount, and so they are losers from the practice.

FOX ET AL., THE NEW STOCK MARKET, supra note 3, at 44–45, 138.
See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, The Behavior of Individual
Investors, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1533, 1534 (George
M. Constantinides, Milton Harris & Rene M. Stulz eds., 2013) (“Many
apparently uninformed investors trade actively, speculatively, and to their
detriment.”).
121
122
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d. Informed Traders
Informed traders of each kind pay the same increased
spread due to the presence of spoofing that uninformed
traders do. This increase in their cost of doing business has a
depressing effect on the level of each of the kinds of informed
activity. This decreases the level of resources going into each
of these activities, which has a negative impact on the wealth
of the suppliers of the specialized inputs.

3. Fairness Considerations
Based on the survey above, we can see that freely occurring
spoofing will not affect the wealth position of uninformed
traders from an ex ante point of view because it is unlikely
that the spoofing will affect the price at which they transact
and if it does, they are as likely to benefit as to be hurt. It may
add to the riskiness of their trading, but this is a risk that can
typically be eliminated by holding a diversified portfolio. They
will face an increase in the bid-ask spread, but on average this
will be compensated by the lower cost of buying shares that
generate a given expected future cash flow.
Any wider bid-ask spread will result in fewer resources
being drawn into the businesses of liquidity supply and
fundamental-value informed trading, thereby decreasing the
wealth positions of their specialized input suppliers.123 A
prospective flow of rents is not an entitlement, however. In a
market economy, the offer of rents to prompt the suppliers of
specialized inputs to come forward is simply the mechanism
by which these resources get directed to the activity for which
they are most particularly suited.124 The effects on the rents
being paid in the case of the businesses being considered here
do not raise any greater fairness issues than do the rents paid
persons with special abilities and skills across the whole
market-based part of our economy.

123
124

See supra Section IV.C.1.
See FOX ET AL., THE NEW STOCK MARKET, supra note 3, at 54,
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The bottom line is that the more serious normative
question concerning spoofing is whether its effect on the
allocation of resources enhances or decreases efficiency.

4. Efficiency Considerations
From an efficiency point of view, spoofing has no
redeeming virtues. Although it will not directly affect price
accuracy in any important way, it consumes resources that
could be usefully employed elsewhere in the economy and it
has a negative impact on liquidity. This in turn can indirectly
hurt price accuracy in ways that are socially harmful.

a. Price Accuracy
As our discussion of the mechanisms of the market shows,
in the absence of manipulation, market prices have the
remarkable quality of reflecting a large amount of information
relevant to predicting an issuer’s future cash flows. Spoofing,
in its direct effects, is unlikely to move price away from where
it otherwise would be. Even if it does, the dislocation will be
so brief as to have no real economic efficiency implications.
Therefore, interestingly, although most commentators and
jurists focus on the price distortion effects of manipulation of
all kinds, reduced price accuracy is not an important direct
consequence of spoofing.125 Recall that accurate prices benefit
the economy by helping allocate the economy’s scarce capital
to the potentially most promising real investment projects.126
Accurate prices also improve the utilization of the economy’s
existing productive capacity by optimizing the signals
provided to management about investment decisions and the
signals given to boards and shareholders about the quality of
management decisions.127 This form of manipulation will
either have no direct effect on prices or will only directly affect
prices for a very brief period of time. Very short run
distortions in price of the kind that will typically occur with

125
126
127

See infra Section VI.
See supra Section III.C.1.
See id.
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spoofing will not seriously undermine the role that share
prices play in guiding the real economy in these ways.
However, this form of manipulation can have an indirect
effect on longer run price accuracy in ways that can be
important to the real economy through its impact on liquidity
and among the various kinds of informed trading. The level of
fundamental-value informed trading will be most sensitive to
this increase in cost. This is because fundamental-value
informed traders create, at a cost to them, the information on
which they trade. A wider spread means their trading will be
less profitable and so they will have less incentive to create
information.128 In contrast, the level of issuer insider and nonissuer insider informed trading and trading based on the tips
of such insiders depends mostly on the opportunities that the
insiders encounter in their employment.129
The decrease in the level of fundamental-value informed
trading is unfortunate because the social gain from its
contribution to long run price accuracy exceeds the social costs
of the activity.130 Thus, the social disadvantage from a lower
level of fundamental-value informed trading is likely to
dominate the advantage from the likely smaller decrease in
the other, socially undesirable, forms of informed trading.

b. Liquidity
The prospect of freely occurring spoofing will lessen
liquidity. It will definitely do so, through its muddying of the
signal of quotes at or slightly less favorable than the NBBO
and the consequent widening of spreads. Although it is
considerably less clear, the trading costs associated with
selling at what had been the bid and buying at what had been
the offer may also widen spreads.
It should be noted that by increasing the cost of supplying
liquidity, spoofing might reduce the number of HFT firms that
would find it profitable to compete. This reduction in the

128
129
130

See supra Section V.2.b.iii.
FOX ET AL., THE NEW STOCK MARKET, supra note 3, at 145, 156.
See Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 31.
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number of strategic competitors can lead to a reduction in the
amount of liquidity supplied. 131
As discussed in Part III, less liquidity reduces social
welfare because of the resulting misallocation of resources
over time and misallocation of risk. Socially beneficial
transactions fail to occur, leaving investors with suboptimal,
riskier portfolios and driving up the cost of capital for firms.132
By raising the costs of fundamental-value informed trading
and thereby lessening the incentives to search out and trade
on new information, less liquidity also reduces longer run
share price accuracy.133

c. Resource Misallocation
If spoofing were freely permitted, it would pull resources
into a socially useless business. If not, these extra resources
would be used elsewhere in the economy, positively
contributing to the production of goods and services.

d. Market Confidence
There is one more, rather nebulous efficiency
consideration: market confidence. This goes to investors’ sense
that the market is fair, which is part of the fifth basic social
goal discussed above. Even if spoofing does not actually
decrease the wealth position of ordinary investors, and any
additional risk that it creates can be diversified away, public
awareness that spoofing occurs may harm everyday investors’
“confidence” in the stock market. The public may view such
manipulations as improper or harmful and hence unfair. As a
result, to their own and others’ detriment, they may reduce
their participation in the stock market.134 Typically, the most
131 See Shmuel Baruch & Lawrence R. Glosten, Tail Expectation and
Imperfect Competition in Limit Order Book Markets, 183 J. ECON. THEORY
661, 662 (2019).
132 See Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 31; Section III.C.2.
133 Id.
134 See Lydia Saad, U.S. Stock Ownership Stays at Record Low, GALLUP
ECON. (May 8, 2013), http://news.gallup.com/poll/162353/stock-ownershipstays-record-low.aspx [http://perma.cc/FU35-QUMR]. Michael Lewis
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effective response to public misunderstanding is education,
but if a perception might be especially stubborn and is causing
damage, then that perception may engender an independent
policy ground for banning the relevant conduct.135

C. The Appropriateness of Legal Sanctions
As noted in Part I, some commentators oppose regulation
of any type of manipulation, at least beyond such obvious
abuses as wash or matched sales.136 Their concern is that no
observable conduct separates manipulative market activity
from market activity that serves socially useful purposes.137
Determining the purpose of the transaction is highly
speculative. The question then is, will making spoofing illegal
deter much socially worthwhile quoting activity as well? Will
persons contemplating making a socially worthwhile quote
fear that it might be mistaken for a manipulative one?
Where there is a pattern of repeated sequences of a small
quote on one side of the market followed almost immediately
by a much larger quote on the other side and then, upon
execution of this smaller quote, the cancellation of the initial
large quote, we think that the intent to use the large quote to
get a more advantageous price for the transaction going the
other way is clear, even more so when all this is immediately
followed by a mirror set of actions. A sudden change in the
information obtained by a trader could explain an occasional
incidence of such a sequence of quoting, trading and
cancellation, but an established pattern of such sequences as
attributes this drop, which has occurred in the face of a sharply rising
market over the last five years, to a sense that the market is unfair. See
MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT 200–01 (2014); see also
Ed. Bd., Opinion, The Hidden Cost of Trading Stocks, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 22,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/23/opinion/best-execution-andrebates-for-brokers.html [http://perma.cc/5U2M-MM2E]; Bradley Hope,
Five Things To Know About Spoofing In Financial Markets, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 22, 2015, 10:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-263B-3591 (on
file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
135 Fox et al., Manipulation, supra note 3, at 102–03.
136 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
137 See id.
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a significant percentage of all market activity is not plausibly
caused by sudden information changes.
A more interesting objection to including spoofing within
the reach of prohibitions on manipulation is the idea that the
market itself can take care of the problem. There is anecdotal
evidence that when a spoofer has been very active in a market
for a while, liquidity suppliers begin to discount the meaning
of large quotes at or away from the best quote in the market
and decline to respond in the way that the manipulator hopes
for. Even if this in fact is going on, we are not convinced that
it is a good reason to give this quoting strategy a pass,
however. An epidemic can be brought under control if enough
people take precautions. But the epidemic still has caused
problems in the interim, and, after it is vanquished, people
will gradually stop taking precautions again and another
epidemic will come along eventually. Moreover, the
precautions themselves are costly. In the context of quote
manipulation, the very discounting of the meaning of the large
quotes is the extreme muddying of the signal that is coming
from the quotes at or near the NBBO that are in fact
indications that informed trading is going on. This lessens the
ability of liquidity suppliers to protect themselves against
such trading and widens spreads.

VI. THE LAW OF SPOOFING
Cases concerning spoofing in the securities markets,
although becoming more prominent, are far less common than
those involving trade-based manipulation.138 Perhaps for this
reason, the federal court and SEC opinions that have
considered the legality of spoofing rely heavily on precedent
that was developed to consider trade-based manipulation.139
With both types of manipulation, the challenge is how an

138 See Jessica Masella & Jonathan Haray, ‘Spoofing’ Prosecutions: The
DOJ’s Approach, N.Y. L. J. (April 2, 2021, 2:40 PM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2021/04/02/spoofingprosecutions-the-dojs-approach/ (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review).
139 Id. (collecting cases).

No. 3:1244]

SPOOFING AND ITS REGULATION

1293

action which is perfectly legal viewed in isolation—
respectively, submitting a quote and entering into a purchase
or sale—can become illegal when repeated in some particular
pattern or under particular circumstances. As with tradebased manipulation, sections 9(a)(2) and 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act remain the primary tools used to
police misconduct.
Little distinction exists in case law between spoofing and
other types of quote manipulation.140 Therefore, to the extent
that a statement in a judicial opinion relating to another type
of quote manipulation appears by its terms equally applicable
to spoofing as well, we will include it in our discussion.

A. Section 9(a)(2)
Section 9(a)(2) prohibits effecting (1) “a series of
transactions” in a security that “creat[e] actual or apparent
active trading” or affect its price, (2) “for the purpose of
inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others.”141
As we have discussed, anything covered by the first prong will
likely induce purchases or sales, and so section 9(a)(2)’s legal
force must come from concluding that the purpose of inducing
these transactions is illegitimate.142 This boils down to the
issue of determining what constitutes sufficient evidence that
the motivation of at least some portion of a person’s trading
activity is solely to move the price.
In considering the application of section 9(a)(2) to spoofing,
however, a threshold issue must first be resolved: Does
section 9(a)(2) by its own terms even cover efforts to move
price through quoting activity? After addressing this question,
we will consider what section 9(a)(2) trade manipulation cases
140 See supra note 18–19 and accompanying text. As noted in Part I,
these would include such other quote-based manipulations as making
quotes inside the existing NBBO solely to move price and submitting quotes
to an exchange in order to influence the NBB or NBO after which favorably
influence the terms on which the quote-maker sends a marketable order to
a broker that will predictably send it on to an internalizer whose pricing is
based on this favorably altered NBB or NBO. See id.
141 See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2018).
142 See supra Part V.
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have to tell us if in fact the provision does properly apply to
quoting activity. Finally, we will consider the substance of the
small number of decided section 9(a)(2) spoofing cases, i.e.,
ones involving quoting at or away from the NBBO.

1. Does Section 9(a)(2) Cover Bids and Offers?
A bid or offer—the tools used by spoofers to move price—is
clearly an “action,” but it is the action of a single person and,
until and unless executed against, involves no counterparty.
So, it is reasonable to ask where the “trans” is to make a bid
or offer a “transaction,” which the first prong of section 9(a)(2)
says is the only thing that it covers?
As this question implies, the most literal reading of the
term “transaction” would seemingly exclude manipulation
based on quoting behavior as outside section 9(a)(2)’s reach.
The few courts that have confronted this issue, however, have
interpreted the term more inclusively. In SEC v. Resch-Cassin
& Co., manipulators drove up the price of an over-the-counter
stock using bids as well as completed purchases in order to
facilitate after-market sales to other traders.143 The court
concluded that bids were included under the term
“transaction,” stating “[s]ince Rule 10b-7 of the Exchange Act
. . . defines the term transaction as “a bid or a purchase”, an
alleged manipulator can be said to effect transactions in a
security if he bids for it in the pink sheets or purchases it or
sells it.”144 This is extremely strained reasoning because the
then existing Rule 10b-7(b) simply provided “for the purposes
of this section the following terms shall have the meaning
indicated: . . . (2) The term transaction shall mean a bid or a
purchase.” 145 In other words, this definition, by its terms, was
intended just for Rule 10b-7, which related to stabilization
143 SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F.Supp. 964, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Interestingly, the finding that section 9(a)(2) was violated in this case seems
to be dicta because section 9(a)(2) at the time of the decision only covered
transactions in exchange listed securities. The court conducted the
section 9(a)(2) analysis to show by analogy that section 10(b) must have
been violated. Id. at 978.
144 Id.
145 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-7(b) (2021) (emphasis added) (replaced 1996).
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activities associated with a securities offering rather than for
the Exchange Act as a whole. Moreover, the definition only
covers bids, not offers, because only bids at the time of an
offering, not offers, are the concern of the rule. The court’s
seeming real reason for including bids and offers within the
reach of section 9(a)(2) is more result-oriented. For example,
the court observed: “The insertion of increasingly higher bids
for a stock in the sheets is an obvious device to create a false
appearance of activity in the over-the-counter market and
tends to support the price at an inflated level.”146 The outcome
from such activity, the court concludes, “was to artificially
stimulate the so-called market price of the stock while making
it appear to be the product of the independent forces of supply
and demand when, in reality, it was completely a creature of
defendants’ subterfuge.”147 In essence, the court side-stepped
the central linguistic question, instead simply saying that
quotes can be used to create the same type of evils as can
completed purchases and sales, and so quotes too should be
considered “transactions.”
The other courts that have addressed the issue of whether
quotes constitute “transactions” under section 9(a)(2) have
either assumed that quotes are “transactions” or summarily
declared so. For example, in the recent case SEC v. Lek
Securities Corp., the court considered a quote manipulation
whereby the defendant entered quotes at successively
increasing (decreasing) prices, moving the NBB (NBO) in
order to execute another order to sell (buy) at a higher (lower)
price than previously existed, immediately upon which the
original quotes were cancelled.148 This pattern was repeated
on both sides of the market, and in multiple securities.149 For
its assertion “a ‘series of transactions’ that create ‘actual or
apparent’ active trading encompasses not only executed
trades but also bids and orders to purchase or sell

146
147
148
149

Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. at 976.
Id. at 978.
SEC v. Lek Sec. Corp., 276 F. Supp. 3d 49, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
Id.
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securities,”150 the court relies on SEC v. Malenfant,151 which
in turn relies on Resch-Cassin.152 Courts in the other cases
take a similar approach.153
Other than the poorly-reasoned Resch-Cassin, we have
found no other court opinions directly addressing why the
term “transaction” should be interpreted more broadly than
the most literal reading of the term. However, there is an
opinion that attempts to do so in a case adjudicated by the
relevant administrative agency, the SEC. In re Kidder
Peabody & Co. is a 1945 discipline action against a brokerdealer.154 The Commission found that because Kidder’s
agents had engaged in a number of bids, it violated section
9(a)(2) despite the fact that only one bond was purchased for
its account, not a series of purchases or sales.155 The
Commission justified this broader interpretation of
“transaction” based on an expansive dictionary definition of
the term, a claim that the terms “transactions” and
“purchases and sales” are used elsewhere in different
contexts, and, most interestingly, section 9(a)(2)’s legislative
history.156 We are not fully convinced by this reasoning. The
150
151

Id. at 62.
Id. (citing SEC. v. Malenfant, 784 F. Supp. 141, 145 (S.D.N.Y.

1992)).
152 Malenfant, 784 F. Supp. at 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing SEC v.
Resch-Cassin, 362 F.Supp. 964, 978 (S.D.N.Y.1973)).
153 See Spicer v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., No. 88 C 2139, 1990 WL
172712, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 1990) (for purposes of section 9(a)(2), noting
in dicta that “plac[ing] bids” would “also qualify” as “means of effecting a
transaction”); Malenfant, 784 F. Supp. 141, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (in a case
concerning violations of sections 9(a)(1) and 9(a)(2), noting that “[i]t was not
necessary for the matched buy and sell orders to have been executed”).
154 Kidder, Peabody & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 3673, 18 S.E.C.
559–60, amended Exchange Act Release No. 3679, 1945 WL 26140 (1945).
155 Id. at 568.
156 The SEC’s reasoned in Kidder:

[W]e do not agree that the term transactions as used in
Section 9(a)(2) is limited to completed purchases or sales.
While the term is not defined in the Act, its broad meaning
in everyday usage, the context in which it is used in the
various sections of the Act, as well as its use in the various
drafts of the bill while under consideration by Congress
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show that as used in Section 9(a)(2) it has a broader
meaning t[h]an purchases or sales.
Id. at 569 (footnote omitted).
With regard to the everyday usage of transactions, the SEC noted that
“Funk & Wagnall’s New Standard Dictionary (1937) defines transaction to
include ‘the conduct of any business . . . any matter or thing that has been
brought partly or wholly to a conclusion . . . any act as affecting legal rights
or obligations[.]’” Id.
In terms of the context in which the term is used, the SEC commented
that “Various sections of the Act refer to transactions and others refer
to purchases and sales but in different contexts. Section 9(a)(2) employs
both terms, and it is obvious from the context that they are not intended to
be synonymous.” Id. at 569 n. 12.
Finally, the SEC analyzed the legislative history of section 9(a)(2):
The legislative history of Section 9(a)(2) shows that
Congress clearly intended its prohibition against
manipulation to extend beyond the actual consummation of
purchases or sales. The original draft of the bill before both
Houses (Sec. 8(a)(3) of S. 2693 and H. R. 7852, 73rd Cong.,
2d Sess.) sought to prohibit “transactions for the purchase
and sale” for manipulative purposes.
That the change from this phrasing to the broader phrasing
now present in the Act was intentional and purposeful is
indicated by committee reports. The Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency in recommending the passage of S.
3420, (a later form of the bill which proposed to prohibit
“any series of transactions”) indicated in its report that
what was intended to be prohibited was affecting the
market artificially by raising or depressing security prices,
or creating actual or apparent activity, whether or not
accomplished by actual purchases or sales. And the
conference report on the bill which became law (H. E. 9323)
shows that both houses intended to make the scope of the
prohibition broader than a mere prohibition of purchases
and sales.
Id. at 569 (footnotes omitted) (citing S. REP NO. 73-792, at 7 (1934) (“Several
devices are employed for the purpose of artificially raising or depressing
security prices. Those which appear to serve no legitimate function are
specifically prohibited. Among such practices fictitious or ‘wash’ sales;
‘matched’ orders or orders for the purchase and sale of the same security
emanating from a common source for the purpose of recording operations on
the tape and thereby creating a false appearance of activity; and other
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claim that making an offer to buy or sell falls within the
ordinary meaning of the term “transaction” does not seem
very plausible on its face, whatever the breadth of possible
meanings assigned to the term in a dictionary; the fact that
the terms “transactions” and “purchases and sales” appear in
different places in the Exchange Act in different contexts does
not mean much absent more explanation in terms of how the
contexts differ; and our own review of section 9(a)(2)’s
legislative history suggests to us that although the
Commission’s argument, based on this legislative history,
that Congress intended section 9(a)(2) to cover quotes is not
completely farfetched, it is also not highly persuasive.157
transactions specifically designed to manipulate the price of a security.”
(emphasis added)) and H.R. REP. 73-1838, at 31 (1934) (“The House bill
(Section 8(a)(2)) contains a provision prohibiting any series of transactions
in a registered security for the purpose of rising or depressing the price of
such security. The corresponding provision in the Senate amendment
prohibits the manipulation of a registered security by means of any series
of transactions effected with the specific intent of raising or depressing such
price. Both provisions were intended to prohibit pool activities, the rigging
or jiggling, or marking up or down of prices by manipulative operations. The
substitute, combining the ideas underlying the Senate and the House
provisions, prohibits any series of transactions in a registered security
creating actual or apparent trading in such security, or raising or
depressing the price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the
purchase or sale of such security by others.” (emphasis added))).
157 With reference to the SEC’s arguments based on legislative history
detailed in supra note 156, at least as plausible explanation for the change
from “transactions for the purchase and sale” in an early version of the bill
to “transactions” in the bill as adopted is simply a reduction in verbosity
through the excising of redundant language. The reference to “other
transactions” in the Senate Committee report could well be meant to cover
purchase and sale transactions that affect price in ways different from how
wash and matched sales create the appearance of activity. The typical
naked open market manipulation, for example, generates profits based on
the expectation that current circumstances suggest a disproportionate price
reaction from the reverse set of transactions. Fox et al., Manipulation, supra
note 3, at 94–96, 104–06. The typical open market transaction with an
external interest manipulation generates expected profits by the gain the
manipulator enjoys as the result of some unrelated interest that depends on
the issuer’s share price being moved by the manipulators first purchase or
sale. Id. at 107–08. Neither of these manipulations fit easily into the
category of “such practices as fictitious or ‘wash’ sales; ‘matched’ orders or
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Once the SEC completed the first step in its analysis and
concluded that there were plausible grounds in language and
history for it to consider a quote as a kind of “transaction,” it
went on to a second step. 158 In this second step, it concluded
that it made sense to determine what quotes fell within the
reach of section 9(a)(2)’s prohibitions by reference to the larger
policy aims of the section, saying that “[i]n an auction market,
the placing of bids, though not met by sellers, may be as
effective an influence on price as a completed sale.”159 So if
one were to accept the SEC’s conclusion in the first step, our
analysis in Part V certainly supports its conclusion in the
second step from a policy perspective.

2. Transaction-based Section 9(a)(2) Case Law as
a Guide to What Quoting Behavior It Prohibits
If bids and offers are properly considered “transactions”
within the purview of section 9(a)(2), it would be reasonable
to use transaction-based section 9(a)(2) cases as a guide to
what kind of quote behavior should also be illegal under the
provision. And indeed, as we will see below, the case law
relating to quote-based manipulation is largely based on the
case
law
surrounding
trade-based
manipulation.
Unfortunately, although the case law related to trade-based
manipulation is littered with references to section 9(a)(2),160
there has been a consistent failure to substantively analyze,
precisely identify, or even define the improper purpose

orders for the purchase and sale of the same security emanating from a
common source for the purpose of recording operations on the tape and
thereby creating a false appearance of activity” and so could require the
reference to “other transactions” in the Senate Report even though each of
these kinds of manipulation does involve purchases and sales. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 18 S.E.C. 559, 570 n.14 (1945).
158 Kidder, Peabody & Co., 18 S.E.C. at 570.
159 Id. The SEC was correct here. Both theory and the empirical
literature support the proposition that unexecuted bids and offers can affect
the price at which executed transactions occur. See supra Part II.
160 See, e.g., Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
Nanopierce Techs., Inc. v. Southridge Cap. Mgmt., No. 02 Civ. 0767, 2002
WL 31819207, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002).
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required by the provision or discuss what evidence would
satisfactorily prove it. Rather, the cases typically only
reiterate the language of the statute and then just assert that
the trading behavior under examination is covered,161 or
provide such question-begging statements as the Seventh
Circuit’s:
[T]he essence of the offense is creating “a false
impression of supply or demand,” for example through
wash sales, where parties fictitiously trade the same
shares back and forth at higher and higher prices to
fool the market into thinking that there is a lot of
buying interest in the stock.162

The two transaction-based section 9(a)(2) cases that do
provide a bit more reasoning each involve what we have
referred to in earlier work as “open market manipulation with
an external interest,” i.e., the situation where a person
engaging in trading that affects a security’s price has a preexisting economic interest in this price independent of making
a profit from the price-affecting trades themselves.163 The
161 See AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 616–17 (7th Cir. 2011);
Sharette v. Credit Suisse Int’l, 127 F. Supp. 3d 60, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); SEC
v. Malenfant, 784 F. Supp. 141, 144–45 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). A private suit
under section 9(a)(2) would also require proof that the relevant transactions
were relied on by the plaintiff, and affected the price of plaintiffs’
transaction. Chemetron Corp. v. Bus. Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1165 (5th
Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983).
162 Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857, 864 (7 th Cir.
1995) (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977)).
163 Fox et al., Manipulation, supra note 3. Some courts have articulated
the notion that an external interest creates an evidentiary presumption, i.e.,
that “it appears to us that a prima facie case exists when it is shown that a
person who has a substantial direct pecuniary interest in the success of a
proposed offering takes active steps to effect a rise in the market for
outstanding securities of the same issuer.” Federal Corp., Exchange Act
Release No. 3909, 25 S.E.C. 227, 230 (Jan. 29, 1947); see also Wright et al.,
Exchange Act Release No. 467, 1938 WL 34042, at *13 (Feb. 28, 1938),
reversed Wright v. SEC, 12 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1940) (“The very existence of an
option when coupled with buying on the market by those having an interest
in its exercise is an indication of a purpose to raise the market price, to
increase market activity and thus to distribute profitably the stock covered
by the option.”).
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first, Resch-Cassin, discussed above, involved the use of
trades as well as quotes to drive up the price of a stock in a
situation where these trades were made to ease an offering’s
after-market sales to other traders.164 The court considered
these trades to be section 9(a)(2) violations because the
defendants “had an obvious incentive to artificially influence
the market price of the security in order to facilitate its
distribution or increase its profitability . . . manipulat[ing] the
after-market to sell the Africa stock to the public.”165 Crane
Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. involved the attempt by one
of two firms competing to take over a target company
engaging in trades to raise the target’s share price.166 The
purpose of doing this was to defeat the competing firm’s tender
offer for the target’s shares.167 The court held that trading
solely to change an issuer’s share price in order to gain an
advantage pursuant to an external interest—in this case, to
defeat a rival acquirer’s tender offer—involved a manipulative
purpose that rendered the trades in violation of
section 9(a)(2).168

3. Quote-based Section 9(a)(2) Cases
In the few decisions concerning quote-based manipulation
and section 9(a)(2), courts summarize the case law around
trade-based manipulation, and then, without further critical
analysis, declare a violation of section 9(a)(2). In Lek, for
example, after reviewing cases discussing open market, trade-

164

SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 975–76 (S.D.N.Y.

1973).
165 Id. at 977. Interestingly, the finding that section 9(a)(2) was violated
in this case seems to be dicta as it was conducted to show that by analogy
section 10(b) must also have been violated. Id. at 975.
166 419 F.2d 787, 795 (2d Cir. 1969).
167 Id.
168 Id. (“In furtherance of its interest in defeating the Crane tender
offer and consummating its own merger with Air Brake, Standard took
affirmative steps to conceal from the public its own secret sales off the
market at the same time it was dominating trading in Air Brake shares at
a price level calculated to deter Air Brake shareholders from tendering to
Crane.”).
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based manipulation, the court summarily concluded that a
violation of section 9(a)(2) was adequately pled, as “[e]ach of
the [manipulation] schemes was designed to create a false
impression of supply or demand for securities and to induce
other market participants to purchase or sell securities.”169
Little further guidance exists in case law as to how to
define illegitimate purpose, although one SEC settlement
addressing quote-based manipulation under section 9(a)(2)
has offered the following somewhat helpful description of
what, according to the SEC, made the trading activity in
question illegitimate:
[The trader’s] intent to induce others to trade at
disadvantaged prices is evident from his repeated
submission of orders at rising (or declining) prices, his
opportunistic executions on the opposite side of the
market after these non-bona fide orders had altered
the stock’s price to his advantage, and his prompt
cancellation of the non-bona fide orders before they
could be executed. The trader’s intent to induce
market participants using algorithmic platforms is
also evident in his usage of 100-share orders
interspersed with pressure orders for much higher
share quantities at prices several cents away from the
inside bid or inside ask in order to induce the purchase
or sale of securities by others who used trading
algorithms that focus on changes to the NBBO or
liquidity imbalances.”170

In this Release, the SEC seems to be focused on the
repeated pattern of submitting orders that induce a price
change, followed by “opportunistic executions on the opposite
side of the market,” and “prompt cancellation” of the initial
SEC v. Lek Sec. Corp., 276 F. Supp. 3d 49, 62 (S.D.N.Y 2017).
Biremis Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 68,456, 105 SEC Docket
862 (Dec. 18, 2012). The scheme is described as follows: “[L]ayering occurs
when a trader creates a false appearance of market activity by entering
multiple non-bona fide orders on one side of the market, at generally
increasing (or decreasing) prices, in order to move that stock’s price in a
direction where the trader intends to induce others to buy (or sell) at a price
altered by the non-bona fide orders. . . . This trading by the Overseas
Traders violated Exchange Act Section 9(a)(2)[.]” Id.
169
170
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“non-bona fide” orders that had not already been executed
against.171

B. Section 10(b)
Exchange Act section 10(b) prohibits any person from
using in a securities transaction “any manipulative or
deceptive device” in contravention of an SEC rule
promulgated thereunder.172 Rule 10b-5 is such a rule and is
the primary engine of regulation under section 10(b). Rule
10b-5 makes it unlawful, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person[.] 173

On the one hand, it is easier than with section 9(a)(2) to
contemplate that whatever is prohibited by Rule 10b-5
includes quoting activity as well as trading activity. Quoting
and trading each involve an action “in connection with the
purchase and sale of a security,” and courts have very broadly
interpreted the “in connection with” clause.174 On the other
hand, we are focusing on manipulation. Rule 10b-5, despite its
broad language, reads much more as a provision focused on
fraud than on manipulation. Indeed, unlike section10(b), the
section of the statute under which the rule was promulgated,
Rule 10b-5 does not even include the term “manipulation.”175
Id. at 11.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018).
173 Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (2021).
174 See Fox et al., Manipulation, supra note 3, at 123, (citing SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 859–61 (2d Cir. 1968)); see also infra Part
VII.A.
175 Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 with 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
171
172
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As we discuss below, there is a split of authority as to whether
trading behavior on its own can ever constitute a Rule 10b-5
violation or whether some additional unlawful act is
necessary. Thus, although it seems like a straightforward
proposition that Rule 10b-5 cases dealing with open market
trade-based manipulation provide useful precedent for quotebased cases, the trade-based case law to which this
proposition refers is confused as to whether Rule 10b-5 even
applies to open market manipulation in the first place.176 This
is critical because most of the case law relating to trade-based
manipulation is based on Rule 10b-5 rather than section
9(a)(2).177

1. Confusion Concerning the Application of Rule
10b-5 to Trade-Based Manipulation
The case law concerning whether Rule 10b-5 applies to
open market manipulation is not consistent. The source of the
problem goes back to a series of Supreme Court decisions in
the 1970s and 1980s where, in cases far removed from
manipulation, the Court emphasized the role of deceit and
misrepresentation in a section 10(b) claim.178 In these cases,

176 Open market manipulation comes in two forms. See Fox et al.,
Manipulation, supra note 3, at 74–75. One is open market manipulation
with an external interest. The other is naked open market manipulation,
which involves the purchase of a number of shares, with an upward push
on prices, and then their resale under circumstances where the
corresponding downward push on prices is less severe, thereby resulting in
the average sale price exceeding the average purchase price. This strategy
yields positive expected profits where, at the time of the purchase, the
trader has good reason to believe that the likelihood of such an asymmetric
price reaction is sufficiently great that it will yield net gains from trading.
177 Id. at 117 (Discussing the reasons for this).
178 Id. at 118 & n.122 (“See, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472
U.S. 1. 8 n.6 (1985) (‘Congress used the phrase “manipulative or deceptive”
in § 10(b) and we have interpreted “manipulative” in that context to require
misrepresentation.’ (citations omitted)); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green. 430
U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (manipulation ‘refers generally to practices, such as
wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead
investors by artificially affecting market activity’ (citations omitted)); Emst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (‘[T]he word “manipulative”
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the Court almost transformed section 10(b) into a statute that
only caught fraud and fraud-like claims within its ambit.179
This culminated in statements by the Court, such as, “Section
10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it
catches must be fraud.”180 The Court’s language has resulted
in a sharp circuit split regarding whether open market
manipulation, without an additional act that is unlawful by
itself, is ever prohibited under section 10(b).
Against this background, the key question in applying
Rule 10b-5 to both trading and quoting is what constitutes a
“manipulative act.” With regards to trading, on one side, there
is a series of court opinions that have been read to assert that
actual trading behavior on its own cannot constitute a
manipulation; some additional unlawful act is necessary as
well. In essence, this would mean that open market
manipulation per se is not illegal under Rule 10b-5. The Third
Circuit, for example, has held that because “the essential
element of the [manipulation] claim is that inaccurate
information is being injected into the marketplace,” trading
for the sole purpose of moving a securities price is not
sufficient to be considered an injection of inaccurate
information into the market place.181 The court reasoned that
because the trades themselves were lawful, they could not be
creating inaccurate information and therefore did not
constitute deceptive trading behavior.182 If this is correct, it is
. . . is and was virtually a term of art when used in connection with
securities markets. It connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to
deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price
of securities.’ (citations omitted))).
179 These developments are discussed in id. at 118–19.
180 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980).
181 GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir.
2001) (quoting In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1286,
1292 (N.D. Ill. 1985)).
182 Id. at 207. In Foss v. Bear, Stearns & Co., the Seventh Circuit
stated, in response to a plaintiff who wanted to “call the [alleged] conduct
‘manipulation’ rather than ‘fraud,’” that “this is a distinction without a
difference” because in “securities law, manipulation is a kind of fraud; deceit
remains essential.” 394 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted). It
should be noted, however, that this is dicta.
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hard to see how spoofing violates Rule 10b-5 since both
spoofing and open market manipulation involve what are
otherwise legal activities, quoting and trading respectively,
with no further illegal act. In each case, it is only the purpose
for which the otherwise legal activity is undertaken—to make
a profit solely from the activity’s influence on prices—that
makes it a manipulation. Indeed, the case for requiring the
additional illegal act may be stronger with quoting than with
trading because every bid or offer risks execution and thus
actually adds to liquidity. A manipulator’s intent to cancel
prior to execution is no guarantee against execution.
Other circuits, however, have come to the opposite
conclusion from the Third Circuit, at least under certain
circumstances. In Markowski v. SEC,183 a case involving open
market manipulation with an external interest, the D.C.
Circuit found that the defendants’ activities violated section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, holding that these provisions proscribe
manipulations involving trades based “solely because of the
actor’s purpose” when that purpose was improper, without
necessitating any further unlawful act.184 The Second Circuit,
has recently stated in dictum that manipulation under section
10(b) does not require “reliance by a victim on direct oral or
written communications by a defendant”185 and that “a
274 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 529.
185 See Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 777 F.3d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 2015).
The case involved a broker-dealer that was accused of prompting its
customers to purchase certain stocks and then later maintaining the price
of these stocks by buying shares in the secondary market, presumably to
increase its clients’ appetites for its next round of recommendations. The
case involves a defendant, who, rather than being the broker-dealer itself,
was someone accused of allowing the broker-dealer to “park” these shares
in his account (i.e., allowing the broker-dealer to sell him the shares it had
purchased but with an understanding that he would be protected against
any drop in price). Id. at 572. The language quoted in the text is dictum
because the court dismissed the complaint against the defendant. According
to the court, the plaintiff failed “to allege acts by [the defendant] that
amounted to more than knowingly participating in, or facilitating,” the
broker-dealer’s fraud. Id. at 25. To be liable in a private damages action, the
court concluded that the defendant would have needed to make the false
communication himself. Id. The fact that this language is dictum is
183
184

No. 3:1244]

SPOOFING AND ITS REGULATION

1307

showing of reliance may be based on ‘market activity’ intended
to mislead investors by sending ‘a false pricing signal to the
market,’ upon which victims of the manipulation rely.”186

2. Rule 10b-5 Spoofing Cases
We have already considered the Lek case in connection
with section 9(a)(2),187 but the court’s pronouncements
concerning that section of the statute are dicta because the
SEC’s claim was that the defendant’s quoting activity violated
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The court concludes that a
violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has been adequately
pled under a theory that under the alleged circumstances, the
bids and offers involved constituted “false” pricing
information.188 In doing so, however, the court does not
provide helpful or critical analysis beyond a recitation of
trade-based manipulation case law. The court assumed the
bids or offers in question to have been non-bona fide,
irrespective of whether they were executed against.189
In another case, CP Stone Fort Holdings, LLC v. Doe(s), the
court determined that all elements of Rule 10b-5 other than
loss causation had been adequately pled in plaintiff’s

important because, although the Circuit appeared to moving in this
direction, there is earlier precedent going the other way. For a review of this
history, see Fox et al., Manipulation, supra note 3, at 120–21.
186 Fezzani, 777 F.3d at 571–72.
187 See supra notes 148–151.
188 SEC v. Lek Sec. Corp., 276 F. Supp. 3d 49, 58–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
189 Id. at 55. The court in Lek does state the following, again focused on
a pattern of quoting, in dicta in response to Lek’s argument that their
“orders were ‘live, real, and actionable’ orders that were subject to market
risk and therefore could not create a false impression of supply and demand
or send a false pricing signal”:
To the extent that the Lek Defendants argue that the entry
of an order in the open market may never constitute
manipulative conduct, they are wrong. Moreover, this
argument largely misses the mark. It ignores the thrust of
the SEC’s claim, which concerns coordinated patterns of
trading, indeed voluminous trading, designed to mislead
the market. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
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complaint.190 Although the complaint is somewhat confusing,
the alleged manipulative scheme had the hallmarks of
spoofing and appears to have been very similar to the Atlee
example: The defendant added size at the NBO, put in a
marketable order going in the opposite direction, and after
that order executed, very quickly cancelled the added size at
the NBO, and then engaged in a mirror set of transactions
going the other way.191 In adjudicating defendant’s motion to
dismiss the amended complaint, the court “agrees with
plaintiff that by alleging a pattern . . . it has sufficiently
alleged that defendants have both injected inaccurate
information into the market, created a false impression of
market activity, and had an illegal intent.”192 Nearly all the
other law that has developed around quote manipulation
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has developed in the
context of SEC administrative proceedings. The SEC has
entered into multiple settlements with firms pursuant to
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 concerning a variety of kinds of
quote manipulation.193 Such manipulation has been described
190 CP Stone Fort Holdings v. Doe(s), No. 16-cv-4991, 2017 WL 1093166
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2017).
191 Second Amended Complaint at 6–7, CP Stone Fort Holdings v.
Doe(s), No. 16-cv-4991, 2017 WL 1093166 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2017).
192 CP Stone Fort Holdings, 2017 WL 1093166, at *4 (emphasis added).
Interestingly, the court originally dismissed the case because plaintiff’s
theory amounted to one equating cancellation with the intention to never
execute. CP Stone Fort Holdings v. Doe(s), No. 16-cv-4991, 2016 WL
5934096, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct 11, 2016). The court is of course correct to this
extent: there are many reasons—many of which perfectly legitimate—for
cancelling an order prior to execution. Without “any allegation of how many
orders were executed, how long the ultimately cancelled orders had
remained resting and available for execution prior to cancellation, or
whether the platform rules required the orders to be exposed further[,]” the
court originally agreed with defendant “that plaintiff’s theory boils down to
an allegation that ‘if a subset of orders was ultimately cancelled, those
orders, in hindsight, must never have been intended to be executed.’” Id.
Nevertheless, the court, in its ruling on the subsequent amended complaint,
seemed to endorse plaintiff’s theory of wrongdoing under Rule 10b-5, though
it again dismissed the complaint but this time on the grounds that plaintiff
did not adequately allege loss causation. Id. at *4, 6–7.
193 See infra note 194–195.
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in one representative settlement as the submission of “nonbona fide orders, or orders that the trader does not intend to
have executed, to induce others to buy or sell the security at a
price not representative of actual supply and demand.”194
More broadly, in an administrative proceeding concerning
auto-execution manipulation, the SEC took the position that
“manipulation is intentional interference with the free forces
of supply and demand.195 The defendant, Terrance
Yoshikawa, had allegedly “engaged in a manipulative scheme
by artificially moving the NBBO in the specified securities and
thereby fraudulently affected the nature of the market for
these securities.”196 Specifically, Yoshikawa had repeatedly
placed a small limit order in one direction that reset the NBO
or NBB and then placed a much larger order in the opposite
direction that he had good reason to believe would be executed
in a venue that used the NBO and NBB as reference prices
even when the order it received was larger than the amount

194 Hold Bros. On-Line Inv. Servs., Exchange Act Release No. 67,924,
Investment Company Act Release No. 30,213, 104 SEC Docket 2686 (Sept.
25, 2012) (inside the spread manipulation) (“Layering concerns the use of
non-bona fide orders, or orders that the trader does not intend to have
executed, to induce others to buy or sell the security at a price not
representative of actual supply and demand.”). There are a number of SEC
settlements for quote manipulation in violation of Rule 10b-5, which offer
little in the way of specific guidance in assessing violations of the law and
do little to distinguish among the types of quote manipulation we have
identified in this article. See, e.g., Behruz Afshar, Securities Act Release No.
10,094, Exchange Act Release No. 78,043, Investment Company Act Release
No. 32,144, 114 SEC Docket 1731 (June 13, 2016) (inside the spread
manipulation) (“Market participants were deceived when they interpreted
the small-lot orders as reflecting genuine demand or supply and joined those
orders with hopes of offering liquidity and earning rebates.”); Briargate
Trading, Securities Act Release No. 9,959, Exchange Act Release No.
76,104, 112 SEC Docket 3263, 3265 (Oct. 8, 2015) (open market
manipulation) (“The non-bona fide buy or sell orders create a false
appearance of buy or sell interest in the security, which often results in a
price change.”).
195 Application of Terrance Yoshikawa for Review of Disciplinary
Action Taken by NASD, Exchange Act Release No. 53,731, 87 SEC Docket
2580, at 8 (Apr. 26, 2006).
196 Id. at 11.
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available in the market at the NBO or NBB.197 This case is
one of many auto-execution manipulation cases that enabled
a manipulator “to buy or sell a security at a price that
otherwise would not have been available in the market,” as
“the investing public and other market participants, including
broker-dealers who rely on the integrity of the NBBO, were
unaware that the NBBO quotes altered as result of [the
manipulator’s] orders, reflected not genuine market activity,
but the [manipulator’s] coordinated actions.”198

VII. ASSESSING THE LAW OF SPOOFING
In our view, spoofing—submitting to an exchange one or
more quotes, each for a large number of shares at a price equal
to, or less favorable than, the preexisting best quote in the
market, and then taking advantage of the resulting change in
the market’s view of the value of the security by trading in the
opposite direction—should be considered illegal. In Part I we
posed a four-question test for when a quoting strategy should
be condemned. First, is the strategy, purely as a conceptual
matter, distinguishable from other, clearly acceptable quoteId. at 2–3.
Ian Fishman, Securities Act Release No. 7547, Exchange Act
Release No. 40,115, 67 SEC Docket 783 (June 24, 1998). see also, e.g., Jason
T. Frazee, Securities Act Release No. 8,209, Exchange Act Release No.
47,522, 79 SEC Docket 2361 (Mar. 18, 2003) (violating section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, “Frazee repeatedly engaged in a pattern of conduct that affected
the NBBO and permitted the execution of orders at prices that would not
otherwise have been available in the market. Frazee’s actions interfered
with the free forces of supply and demand and undermined the integrity of
the NBBO.”); Leonard Sheehan, Securities Act Release No. 8208, Exchange
Act Release No. 47,521, 79 SEC Docket 2359 (Mar. 18, 2003) (violating
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, “Sheehan repeatedly engaged in a pattern of
conduct that affected the NBBO and permitted the execution of orders at
prices that would not otherwise have been available in the market.
Sheehan’s actions interfered with the free forces of supply and demand and
undermined the integrity of the NBBO.”); Joseph R. Blackwell, Securities
Act Release No. 8030, Exchange Act Release No. 45,018, 76 SEC Docket 502
(Nov. 5, 2001) (same); Israel M. Shenker, Securities Act Release No. 8029,
Exchange Act Release No. 45,017, 76 SEC Docket 501 (Nov. 5, 2001) (same);
Robert J. Monski, Securities Act Release No. 7,975, Exchange Act Release
No. 44,250, 74 SEC Docket 1815 (May 3, 2001) (same).
197
198
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driven strategies, and does the strategy under examination
cause social harm? Second, does the strategy plausibly fit
under the broad dictionary meaning of the term
“manipulation”? Third, are there circumstances under which
the strategy can yield positive expected profits, and do they
occur frequently enough to cause concern? Fourth, are there
practical procedures for implementing a ban on the strategy
whereby the social gains from its reduction or elimination
exceed the social costs of doing so, including deterring socially
valuable activity that might be erroneously identified as
examples of the practice? With spoofing, as discussed below,
all four questions can be answered affirmatively. The existing
case law roughly accomplishes the goal of making the practice
illegal, but it lacks clarity and makes errors in its reach.

A. Optimal Regulation
The analysis in this Article easily shows affirmative
answers to the first, third and fourth questions. As for the first
question, we established in Part V that the strategy is
distinguishable from clearly acceptable quote-driven
activities and causes social harm. Spoofing, directly, or
indirectly through the market anticipating its occurrence,
lessens both liquidity and price accuracy, wastes productive
resources by supporting a socially useless activity, and lessens
market confidence.199 We have also seen that the practice can
yield positive expected profits.200 The instances of
enforcement against spoofers and the sizes of their alleged
profits suggest that instances of it occur frequently enough to
cause concern.201 And we have identified objectively
observable factors that can serve as a condition for imposing
legal sanctions on undesirable trades, while minimizing
prosecution of socially desirable trades.
The answer to the second question requires a bit more
explication. We do not have any trouble concluding that
spoofing fits within the dictionary definition of
199
200
201

See supra Section V.B.4.
See supra Section V.A.
See supra Part VI.
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“manipulation.”202 The problem is that neither Exchange Act
section 9(a)(2)203 nor section 10(b)204 and Rule 10b-5205
directly outlaw anything that could be termed “manipulation.”
Section 9(a)(2) outlaws “a series of transactions” that in
effect have as their purpose manipulation.206 It may be too
great a stretch, however, to argue that quoting involves
engaging in “transactions.” As we have seen, the district
courts that have found quoting activity to violate section
9(a)(2) have either largely ignored this difficulty or dealt with
it in an unconvincing fashion.207 If a federal court of appeals
or the Supreme Court took a serious look at the issue, we are
not fully confident that they would find quotes to be
transactions.
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 constitute a more solid route
to finding a doctrinal basis for implementing our approach to
outlawing spoofing. Our analysis in preceding parts leads to
the conclusion that quote-based manipulation can be
analogized to misstatement manipulation.208 This is because
the manipulators, by placing bids and offers that other market
participants believe contain information about the future
prospects of the issuer, profit off of the market’s reaction. As
two of us have analyzed elsewhere, misstatement
manipulation can be thought of as a subset of informed
trading, where the manipulator is privately informed that the
information that the market believes to be true is in fact
false.209

202 In its definition of “manipulate,” the Merriam-Webster dictionary
includes “to change by artful or unfair means so as to serve one’s purpose[.]”
Manipulate,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/manipulate [https://perma.cc/5VM5-QNAX] (last
visited Dec. 24, 2021).
203 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2018).
204 Id. § 78j(b).
205 Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (2021).
206 See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2).
207 See supra Section VI.A.
208 See supra Section VI.B.
209 See Fox et al., Manipulation, supra note 3, at 112.
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Rule 10b-5(b) makes it unlawful for any person “to make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security.”210 When, in our spoofing example, Atlee has his
broker submit a quote to an exchange on his behalf, he is in
essence making the following statement: “I am prepared,
unless and until I cancel, to be legally bound to buy or sell x
amount of securities at y price.” This statement is
communicated to the market by the posting of the quote on an
exchange. Though literally true, it is at least arguably
misleading. Others would reasonably assume that submitter
of the quote in fact wants someone to execute against the bid
or offer, when the opposite is the case. Atlee would have to say
he does not want anyone to execute against his quote to make
the statement not misleading.211
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
At least one precedent exists that the submission of an order can,
under particular circumstances, be a misleading statement in violation of
Rule 10b-5. VanCook v. SEC, 653 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2011) is a case arising
out of the mutual fund “late trading” scandals of the early 2000s. The
defendant VanCook, a broker, aided his mutual-fund-specialized hedge fund
customers in an arrangement that regularly allowed them to determine
after 4:00 p.m. their orders for amount of mutual fund shares to buy or
redeem for the day. Id. at 133. 4:00 p.m. was the time at which each mutual
fund set its net asset value (NAV), the price at which it would redeem or sell
its shares for the day. Id. This NAV was based on the closing prices of the
securities that the mutual fund held in its portfolio. Id.
VanCook’s arrangement allowed the hedge funds to take advantage of
post-4:00 p.m. developments that indicated expected profits from a purchase
or redemption that could be made given the NAV that was set at 4:00 p.m.
Id. The way the arrangement worked was to take advantage of the mutual
fund’s clearing bank’s procedure that permitted persons who had submitted
orders prior to 4:00 p.m. to correct errors in those orders after 4:00 p.m. Id.
at 134. VanCook assisted his customers to take advantage of this procedure
by submitting orders prior to 4:00 p.m. that did not really reflect how many
shares they wanted to buy or redeem, but rather were simply a place holder
that they would alter, using the error-cleaning-up procedure, after 4:00 p.m.
based on post-4:00 p.m. determinations of how many shares to redeem or
purchase. Id. In other words, they regularly submitted to VanCook orders
prior to 4:00 p.m. which were time-stamped as such, and then, after 4:00
210
211
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There has long been a basis in court-made law for imposing
sanctions for making misstatements related to securities
trading. As far back as 1968, the Second Circuit ruled in SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur that whenever an issuer makes a
statement that is “reasonably calculated to influence the
investing public,” such a statement satisfies Rule 10b-5’s
requirement that it be “in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security,” even if neither the issuer nor its managers buy
or sell shares themselves. 212 This interpretation of the “in
connection with” requirement has subsequently been
expanded to reach other persons besides the issuer and its
officials, and to include the statements of these other persons

p.m., sent in “corrected” orders that were really represented post-4:00 p.m.
purchase or redemption determinations. VanCook then passed on to the
clearing bank these “corrections.” Investment Company Act Rule 22c-1, 17
C.F.R § 270.22c-1, requires that orders submitted by customers to their
brokers after the determination of the day’s NAV must be executed at the
next day’s NAV. Id. at 135. The Second Circuit found that VanCook was
aiding a violation of Rule 10b-5(b) by his hedge fund customers. Id. at 138.
The idea was that the mutual funds reasonably assumed that the
submission of an order for execution at the current day’s NAV was in an
amount determined prior to the setting of the day’s NAV since Rule 22c-1
would prohibit execution, at that day’s NAV, of post-4:00 p.m. determined
orders. Id.
While this precedent establishes that a purchase or sale order can be a
misleading statement, it is admittedly not a perfect analogy to spoofing. In
the late-trading case, it violated an SEC rule for the mutual funds to execute
the orders passed on by VanCook at the current day’s NAV and so the court
was saying in essence that it is reasonable for the mutual fund to assume
that the orders it received would be in compliance with Rule 22c-1 when
executed. In contrast, whether it is reasonable for the market to assume
that quotes are not the product of spoofing cannot depend on whether
spoofing violates Rule 10b-5(b): We are asking the question concerning
reasonable market expectations to determine whether spoofing violates
Rule 10b-5 in the first place. That said, we have shown that spoofing fits the
dictionary definition of manipulation and answers our three other questions
in the affirmative. So, the fact that section10(b), under which Rule 10b-5
was promulgated, authorizes rules against “manipulative” as well
“deceptive” “device[s]” argues in favor of a reading of Rule 10b-5(b) to
include, as a misleading statement, a spoofer’s quotes intended to move
market prices. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
212 SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 859–62 (2d Cir. 1968).
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when they would predictably affect investors’ judgments.213
Moreover, the courts have made clear that in governmentbased actions, there need not be a showing of reliance by the
particular purchasers or sellers of shares.214

B. Comparing Existing Case Law to Optimal Regulation
Let us now compare our description of existing case law to
what we have just described as optimal regulation. First,
section 9(a)(2) is an insecure basis for outlawing spoofing in
the manner we recommend, because by its terms, its trigger
is a series of “transactions.”215 Although district courts and
the SEC have found quotes to be “transactions,” 216 their
rationales for doing so are not fully convincing and it is
certainly possible that an appellate court would not agree with
them.217 Second, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 provide a
doctrinally sounder basis. Section 10(b) unambiguously
authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules against
manipulation. The language of Rule 10b-5 is not obviously the
rule to do this, but, as we have argued, spoofing can be viewed
as a kind of misleading statement in violation of Rule 10b5(b).218 The existing case law, however, is rather confused and
suggests that the statute and the rule can be interpreted both
under inclusively and over inclusively.
If, as we argue, a spoofer’s submission of quotes solely to
move price is a violation of Rule 10b-5’s prohibition against
making misleading statements, how in the absence of
documentary evidence can it be determined that this was the
sole purpose for submitting the quotes? We have suggested
that an established pattern of repeated sequences of large
quotes on one side followed almost immediately by a smaller

213 See Adam C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Texas Gulf
Sulphur and the Genesis of Corporate Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 71 SMU
L. REV. 927, 939–42 (2018).
214 Id.
215 See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2).
216 See supra Section VI.A.
217 See supra Section VII.B.
218 See id.
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marketable quote on the other side and then, upon execution
of this smaller quote, the cancellation of the initial large
quote, is sufficient circumstantial evidence to conclude that at
least in some of the instances of this pattern, the sole intent
to use the first quote was to get a more advantageous price for
the transaction going the other way. This is even more clear
when this pattern in most instances is followed by a mirror
set of actions going the other way. Those courts that find Rule
10b-5 violations in such cases, analogizing the quoting activity
to trade-based open market transactions, are doing the right
thing.
As we have seen, however, there are courts that have held
that actual trading behavior on its own cannot constitute a
manipulation and that some additional unlawful act is
necessary—in essence that open market manipulation is per
se not illegal under Rule 10b-5.219 These courts, by
misinterpreting earlier Supreme Court opinions relating to
matters far removed from manipulation, are doing the wrong
thing with regard to trade-based manipulation. And
derivatively, they would likely do the wrong thing as well if
they were faced with a spoofing case. The logic they use in
trade-based open market cases—that trading by itself is
perfectly legal and therefore something independently illegal
is necessary for the manipulative trades to violate Rule 10b5—would seem equally applicable with regard to spoofing: just
substitute “quoting” for “trading.” What is missed in this logic
when it comes to spoofing is that a perfectly legal activity—
generally quoting—can be used in an anti-social way if its only
purpose is to change prices by sending a misleading signal.
Evidence that a person repeatedly engaged in spoofing’s
pattern of behaviors can often be persuasive evidence that this
is exactly what is going on.
On the other hand, because quote manipulation has been
under theorized both economically and legally, courts can also
be too quick to include some quoting behavior as a basis for
Rule 10b-5 liability. It makes little sense, in our view, to apply
a fraud-on-the market theory to a spoofing case, as was done

219

See supra Section VI.B.1.
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in the CP Stone Fort Holdings220 case discussed earlier. There,
the court ultimately granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss. It did so on the basis of an erroneous understanding
of what needs to be shown to establish loss causation in a
fraud-on-the-market case221 rather than rejecting the
application of the fraud-on-the-market theory to a spoofing
case in the first place.
The first step in understanding why it is inappropriate to
apply the fraud-on-the-market theory to spoofing cases is to
note, as shown in Part V, that it is liquidity suppliers who are
induced into loss-resulting action by the quotes introduced by
a spoofer. In essence, they relied on these quotes as being
statements by their submitter that it genuinely wanted the
quote—unless and until cancelled—to be executed against. If
a liquidity supplier can offer convincing evidence that it acted
because of the spoofer’s quotes, it would be able to bring a
traditional reliance-based action for damages against the
spoofer. The idea consistent with the traditional reliancebased Rule 10b-5 private damages action,222 is that the Rule

No. 16-cv-4991, 2017 WL 1093166 at *5 (N.D.III. Mar. 22, 2017).
Id. at *5–6. The court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate
loss causation because it “has not tied those purchases or sales [that it
connects to the alleged manipulation] to any loss because the complaint fails
to allege the reversal of each transaction[,]” id. at *6, citing the Supreme
Court’s decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,
342–43 (2005). In Dura, the Court did not hold that the plaintiff needed to
reverse its transaction to demonstrates loss causation, rather it held that
only showing that the purchase price was inflated due to the defendant’s
misstatement is not by itself enough to demonstrate loss causation. Id. at
346. The key to showing loss causation is not resale at a loss, but rather a
drop in price due to the Rule 10b-5 violation no longer inflating price at a
time when the plaintiff still holds her shares. Thus, the Court in Dura notes
that “the Restatement of Torts . . . set[s] forth the judicial consensus,
say[ing] that a person who ‘misrepresents the financial condition of a
corporation in order to sell its stock’ becomes liable to a relying purchaser
‘for the loss’ the purchaser sustains ‘when the facts . . . become generally
known’ and ‘as a result’ share value ‘depreciate[s].’ § 548A, Comment b, at
107.” Id. at 344.
222 See Merritt B. Fox, After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market
Actions, 31 J. CORP. L. 829, 832 (2006) (exploring the difference in the causal
connection between the Rule 10b-5 violation and the plaintiff’s loss in a
220
221
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10b-5 violation—the spoofer’s quotes—caused the plaintiff to
act to its disadvantage.
The fraud-on-the-market theory is an alternative Rule
10b-5 private damages cause of action. It is based on the
theory that the Rule 10b-5 violation changed the price at
which the plaintiff traded, even though she might have traded
even if the misstatement had not been made.223 As we saw
earlier, in the Atlee example, only the liquidity suppliers, no
one else, were hurt by the spoof. As a result, there would be
no basis for a damages action by anyone under either cause of
action other than by these liquidity suppliers, who can use the
traditional reliance-based cause of action.224Spoofing in
alternative configurations, however, could, with an initial
submission of quotes at or above the NBO, result in a slight
lowering of both the NBB and NBO. However, this dip would
last for only a very, very brief time because the spoofer will
cancel these quotes as soon as his sell order executes.225
Therefore in any given instance of a spoof with such
alternative configuration, a few ordinary trader sellers might
lose by a small amount and a few ordinary trader buyers
would win by an equivalently small amount. With the
spoofer’s subsequent mirror set of actions, the opposite effects
will occur. Ex ante, an ordinary investor is as likely to be a
buyer as a seller, making herself as likely to gain as to lose if
she transacted in either of these two stages of the spoof.
Moreover, the trader who suffers a loss from one iteration of a
spoofer’s spoof quite possibly may be the gainer from another.
Such a small change in price, because of its brevity affects only
a small number of traders in any given instance of spoofing. It
may also work the other way for these traders in another
instance. Thus, it is not a good justification for bringing the

traditional reliance based private damages action versus this causal
connection in a fraud-on-the-market one).
223 See id. at 855.
224 See supra Part VII.
225 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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socially expensive fraud-on-the-market class action type of
litigation.226
In the final analysis, it is likely that the main deterrent to
spoofing will need to be government enforcement, not private
damages litigation. This is because, as argued above, a fraudon-the-market suit is not appropriate. It is also because a
traditional reliance-based action by the adversely affected
liquidity suppliers, while perfectly appropriate from a
doctrinal and policy point of view, may be difficult for these
suppliers to bring successfully. The problem for the liquidity
suppliers is that it may be hard for them to present convincing
evidence that their actions were in response to the spoofers’
quotes even when that was in fact the case.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The precise reach of federal securities manipulation law
has long eluded critical consensus. Spoofing is no exception
despite the spate of recent enforcement actions against those
accused of the practice. In response, this Article has sought to
clarify the understanding of spoofing through the lens of
microstructure economics. It has also sought to answer
essential normative and practical questions around the scope
of illegal manipulation. By elucidating the mechanisms of
spoofing, assessing who is hurt and helped by the practice and
its impact on social welfare, and evaluating optimal legal
226 Total settlements for the years 2009-2018 have averaged about
$3.55 billion per year; CORNERSTONE RSCH., SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENTS: 2018 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 3 (2018). Available data suggests
that contingent-fee awards to plaintiffs’ lawyers in securities class-action
lawsuits average around 25 percent. Lynn A. Baker, Michael A. Perino &
Charles Silver, Is the Price Right? An Empirical Study of Fee-Setting in
Securities Class Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371, 1394 (2015). If we
assume that defendants’ lawyers are paid fees comparable to this amount,
this would suggest that the total annual legal expenses in recent years for
the two sides associated with securities class actions (the defense’s legal fees
ultimately being paid by shareholders and the plaintiff’s legal fees coming
out of the recovery) totaled about $1.8 billion ((0.25 + 0.25) x $3.55 billion).
This figure on legal expenses does not include the additional social costs
associated with the time consumed by the officials of the parties to the
litigation and by the judiciary.
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responses, this Article has offered a new understanding of
spoofing that can guide regulatory responses without
inadvertently capturing socially beneficial quoting activity.

